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THE CONTENT/ENVELOPE DISTINCTION IN INTERNET
LAW
MATTHEW J. TOKSON*
ABSTRACT
Whether a component of an Internet communication is classified
as "content" or "envelope" information determines in large part the
privacy protection it receives under constitutional and statutory law.
Courts and Internet law scholars have yet to offer a means of
determining the content/envelope status of unique aspects of Internet
communications-from email subject lines to website URLs. As a
result, data with the potential to expose every website, every Internet
file downloaded, and every email sent by an Internet user may be
unprotected under current law.
This Article develops a legal framework for distinguishing content
from envelope information in unique areas of Internet communica-
tions. Drawing on a practical analysis of the structure of the Internet
and an evaluation of relevant common law and Fourth Amendment
doctrines, the Article proposes that electronic information that can
reveal the underlying text or subject matter of an Internet communi-
cation must be classified as content. The Article identifies several
areas in which application of this principle is necessary to resolve
difficult questions about the legal status of an Internet communica-
tion, and gives, for the first time, a comprehensive account of the
content status of Internet communications, from email body text to
website IP addresses. The proposed framework provides a judicially
manageable and normatively attractive means for courts to deter-
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mine the legal status of novel communications technologies, present
and future. Ultimately, resolving the content/envelope distinction
has the potential to clarify other unanswered and controversial
questions in Fourth Amendment and statutory privacy law.
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INTRODUCTION
The statutory framework governing the surveillance of electronic
communications has been in place since 1986,1 well before the
advent of the World Wide Web and the popularization of the
Internet. The relevant constitutional framework was established
even earlier, in cases such as Katz v. United States2 and Smith v.
Maryland,3 which applied the Fourth Amendment to government
agents' interceptions of telephone conversations and dialed phone
numbers. Meanwhile, web browsing and web-based email have been
widely available to computer owners since 1995,' and a large
proportion of U.S. households has had Internet access since 1997.5
Both computer crimes (such as "hacking") and crimes involving the
use of computers have increasingly become a major concern of law
enforcement agencies.' Yet, after a decade of widespread Internet
use and several years of prosecutions using Internet-based evidence
1. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
2. 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
3. 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979).
4. Dave Crocker, Email History, http://www.livinginternet.com/e/ei.htm (last visited Mar.
11, 2009) (describing how email providers America Online and Delphi began to connect their
email programs to the Internet in 1993); Windows History: Internet Explorer History, June
30, 2003, http://www.microsoft.com/windows/WinHistoryIE.mspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2009)
(describing the marketing of the Internet Explorer web browser in 1995); see also Warren E.
Agin & Scott N. Kumis, A Framework for Understanding Electronic Information Transactions,
15 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 277, 281 (2005) (describing how the development of the graphics-
based web browser Mosaic in 1993 helped lead to the popularization of the Internet).
5. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2003, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p23-208.pdf (reporting
that 18 percent of U.S. homes had Internet access as of 1997, whereas 54.7 percent of homes
had access in 2003). Today, the United States has roughly 220 million Internet users. Internet
World Stats, Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users, http://www.
Internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
6. See COMPUTER SEC. INST., 2005 CSI/FBI COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY
(2005), available at http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/Bookstore/Documents/2005CSISurvey.pdf;
David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Child Pornography: Patterns from NIBRS, JUVENILE
JUSTICE BULLETIN (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs), Dec. 2004, at 6, available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/204911.pdf (reporting that 7 to 13 percent of child
pornography crimes committed between 1997 and 2000 involved the use of a computer); Press
Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, New FBI Computer Crime Survey (Jan. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2ijan06/computer-crime-surveyO11806.htm.
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within a structure of well-established law, several fundamental
questions regarding government surveillance of the Internet remain
unanswered. For instance, the Fourth Amendment status of email
content remains ambiguous, while the constitutional and statutory
status of web surfing data is entirely unresolved.
This continuing uncertainty is largely the product of the unique
characteristics of current electronic communications law. First, the
difficulty of applying the Supreme Court's current Fourth Amend-
ment precedents to modern communications technologies has likely
motivated courts to avoid deciding such issues whenever possible.7
Second, questions involving electronic communications statutes
are infrequently litigated in criminal cases because the relevant
statutes do not provide an exclusionary remedy for illegal govern-
ment acquisitions of electronic data.8 Yet, as both Internet use and
the government's surveillance of such use become more pervasive,
courts have finally been forced to grapple with some of the difficult
questions surrounding the legal protection afforded to Internet
communications.9
Perhaps the most practically significant of these unresolved
questions is whether novel categories of Internet communications
data, such as email subject lines,10 website Uniform Resource
Locators (URLs)," and website IP addresses,"2 should be protected
7. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 3, 1 34, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwald-first-principles.pdf. For
examples of courts avoiding Fourth Amendment questions and resolving cases on alternative,
arguably specious grounds, see Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525-26 (6th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (avoiding the question of whether there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy in email content by finding that the plaintiffs case was unripe); United States v.
Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002) (declining to decide whether there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy in email content by holding that a warrant served without police
presence was reasonably executed); United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9-10 (D.D.C.
2007) (concluding that, because an officer's reliance on the Stored Communications Act (SCA)
was reasonable and because the Act did not provide for a suppression remedy, the court "need
not consider the constitutionality of the SCA").
8. See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog"of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 823-24 (2003).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); Warshak v. United
States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing
the Use of a Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D. Mass. 2005).
10. See discussion infra Part II.E.
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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as the contents of electronic communications, or whether they
should be treated as noncontent "envelope" information. The ques-
tion is a profoundly important one because the legal protection
afforded the two types of information is dramatically different in
both constitutional and statutory law. Further, due in large part to
the confusion over content status, electronic data with the potential
to expose the websites visited and email messages sent by a web
user may be unprotected from private or government intrusion
under current law. Although Internet law scholars and commenta-
tors have mentioned the importance and the troublesome complex-
ity of the issue,"3 none have put forth a theory as to which aspects
of a communication are content and which are not under constitu-
tional or statutory law.
Obviously, simply identifying the nature of this complex and
unresolved area of law is not enough. This Article attempts to
develop a conceptual framework of electronic communications
content that will allow courts to determine whether even the most
novel forms of Internet communications information are content or
noncontent as a matter of law. Part I of the Article describes the
central importance of the content/noncontent distinction in the
constitutional and statutory law of Internet surveillance. Part II
examines the content status of relatively well-understood Internet
communications information such as email addresses and Internet
subscriber information. Part III discusses the unresolved content
status of novel forms of communications information such as web
surfing data and develops a framework for classifying such informa-
tion as content or noncontent. Part IV analyzes the implications of
the proposed content/noncontent framework for the constitutional
and statutory protection afforded to new forms of Internet commu-
nications content. It then describes how a clearer conception of
content in such communications will leave courts in a better position
to confront other complex questions of Internet surveillance law.
13. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
2009] 2111
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTENT/NONCONTENT DISTINCTION IN
INTERNET SURVEILLANCE LAW
For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment protects mailed letters and packages from
inspection by postal authorities or other government agents.14 Yet
from the start, the Court has distinguished between the content of
a letter and the noncontent information disclosed on its envelope.
Whereas noncontent envelope information is exposed and can be
examined by anyone, the content of a letter is "as fully guarded from
examination and inspection" as it would be if the party mailing the
letter had retained it in his or her own home.' 5
The content/noncontent distinction remains important in the
constitutional and statutory law governing the inspection of pri-
vate communications, even as new technologies have dramatically
altered the nature of communication itself. Of course, one could
question the application of the content/noncontent distinction, which
was developed in the unique context of paper mail, to new forms of
communications such as the telephone and the Internet. Whether
as a normative matter the distinction is insufficiently protective of
a privacy interest in the circumstances of one's communications is
a question for another day.'6 In any event, the distinction is firmly
established in communications surveillance law, and any attempt
to dislodge it would likely be quixotic. There is, at least, a good argu-
ment that the content/noncontent distinction captures a qualitative
difference in the intimacy of different types of communications
information: while the lonely traveler might consider the fact that
14. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980); Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727, 733 (1877). The court has also confirmed that sealed packages given to private carriers
are Fourth Amendment "effects" in which the public has a "legitimate expectation of privacy"
vis-A-vis the government. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). However,
"[clommon carriers have a common-law right to inspect packages they accept for shipment,
based on their duty to refrain from carrying contraband." Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765,
769 n.1 (1983). The same principle applies to regular mail. See Warshak, 490 F.3d at 474.
15. Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
16. A forthcoming paper argues in great detail for the normative desirability of the
content/noncontent distinction. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to Internet
Communications: A General Approach, 61 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at
4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348322.
2112 [Vol. 50:2105
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he called his wife at midnight from his hotel to be private, surely it
is the conversation itself that he considers most intimate and
confidential.
Indeed, the content of telephone calls is protected by the Fourth
Amendment, 7 whereas phone numbers (which are exposed to the
phone company and involve only noncontent information) are
not. 18 Statutorily, interception of the content of a telephone call is
governed by the Wiretap Act, 9 which sets rigorous standards for
court orders permitting government wiretaps and provides for the
exclusion of evidence derived from communications intercepted in
violation of the Act.20 By contrast, the interception of noncontent
telephone numbers is governed by the Pen Register Act,2' which
mandates court approval of surveillance if the government certifies
that the information likely to be obtained is "relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation" and which provides no exclusionary rule.22
The content/noncontent distinction is equally central to the con-
stitutional and statutory framework that governs state surveillance
of Internet communications.
A. The Content/Noncontent Distinction in the Fourth Amendment
Law of Internet Communications
The Supreme Court has determined that both tangible things
(papers, effects) and intangible things (such as the sounds of a
telephone conversation) can be searched within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 23 A search occurs wherever the government
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
18. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
20. Id. § 2518.
21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
22. Id. § 3123(a), (c).
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). The Fourth Amendment states
that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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infringes upon a person's reasonable "expectation of privacy.' 24 In
order for the Fourth Amendment to apply, a two-pronged test must
be met: (1) the person must have an actual, subjective expectation
of privacy, and (2) the expectation must be one that society is
prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable.25
Whether Internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their emails and web surfing data is largely unresolved. Unlike
traditional letters, emails and web surfing communications are
often copied in transit by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and are
(in theory) easily accessed by ISP employees. 26 Because emails and
other forms of Internet communications are arguably exposed to
third parties during transmission, it remains controversial whether
the Fourth Amendment protections that apply to the contents of
letters and telephone calls can apply to them.27 Yet, an emerging
body of case law suggests that the content/noncontent distinction
is crucial in determining whether Internet communications are
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Most cases decided since the popularization of the Internet have
dealt with the unique situations of public chat groups or employees
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968) ("[W]herever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy' ... he is
entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; see, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). Note
that the second prong is generally the controlling factor, and Fourth Amendment protection
might be found even where an individual lacks a subjective expectation of privacy. See Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984). For example, when an individual's subjective
expectation is eliminated by the announcement of a normatively unacceptable means of
government intrusion (such as a policy of warrantless home searches), a normative inquiry
based solely on the second prong would be proper. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5
(1979).
26. See In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(describing how a website recorded URL data); PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS
87 (2001) (describing how emails are transmitted); Deirdre K Mulligan, Reasonable
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557, 1563 (2004) (describing email
transmission and noting that unencrypted email messages could in theory be read by ISP
employees); Ryan Singel, Which ISPs Are Spying on You?, WIRED, May 5, 2007, available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/O5/isp-privacy (suggesting that many
ISPs record URL data); see also Kerr, supra note 8, at 812-16 (suggesting that the
transmission process may eliminate any Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in email).
Also, emails are often scanned by anti-spain software. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d
455, 474 (6th Cir. 2007).
27. See discussion infra Part IV.
2114 [Vol. 50:2105
2009] CONTENT/ENVELOPE DISTINCTION 2115
using at-work computer systems that were regularly monitored
by their employers.2" Finally, in the 2007 case Warshak v. United
States, a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Fourth Amendment applies to the contents of emails.29 In so
holding, it placed a great deal of weight on the content/noncontent
distinction, stating that the Supreme Court's "combined precedents
of Katz and Smith" applying the Fourth Amendment to telephone
calls "recognize a heightened protection for the content of the com-
munications."3 ° The court found a strong "content-based privacy
interest" in a user's emails, one that cannot be eliminated in the
absence of total access by a third party to their contents.3' However,
the Sixth Circuit subsequently granted a petition for rehearing en
banc in Warshak and ultimately avoided the constitutional issue,
vacating the decision on the ground that the case was unripe.32 Yet,
despite the en banc judgment, the arguments put forth in the panel
opinion are likely to surface again as other circuits are forced to rule
on the Fourth Amendment status of Internet communications,
either in response to facial challenges or to as-applied challenges
arising in criminal cases or Bivens suits.33 The Warshak panel's
holding suggests a likelihood that at least some circuits will find a
28. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in records of his Internet use when his
employer's policy was to monitor computer use); United States. v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp.
1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding no expectation of privacy in conversations posted to
public chat rooms); United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (finding no
expectation of privacy in email messages stored on a monitored, government-owned computer
system).
Prior to 2007, one court found that the Fourth Amendment protected the content of email
sent via the private ISP America Online. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417
(C.A.A.F. 1996). The court relied largely upon America Online's policy of not reading or
disclosing users' email. Id. Its value as precedent is probably limited due to its status as a
military case. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999).
29. 490 F.3d 455, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
30. Id. at 471.
31. Id. at 474; see also id. at 476 (requiring that the government show "complete access"
to email content in order to demonstrate the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy).
32. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521,526, 529-30 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (finding
that Warshak, who had sought an injunction against the government, was unlikely to be the
target of future email searches and therefore did not present an Article III case or
controversy).
33. See id. at 531-32 (describing how Warshak could have obtained a ruling on the
constitutional issue through a Bivens action or potentially through a motion to suppress
evidence in his criminal trial).
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constitutional expectation of privacy in email content. In fact, in a
recent case dealing primarily with text messages, the Ninth Circuit
indicated that email content should receive the same constitutional
protections as the content of letters.34
By contrast, the few cases that have dealt with noncontent in-
formation related to Internet communications strongly suggest that
there is no Fourth Amendment protection for such information. For
instance, in United States v. Hambrick, the Fourth Circuit held that
there was no Fourth Amendment protection for the subscriber
information that a user submitted to an ISP in order to set up an
email account, relying on the fact that noncontent information is not
protected under Smith.35 Further, in the recent case United States
v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit directly held that there was no
Fourth Amendment interest in the to/from addresses of emails,
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of websites, or the total volume of
file transfers associated with an Internet user's account.36 The
Forrester court also based its judgment on the significant distinction
in Smith between the content and noncontent information of com-
munications.37 According to the court, surveillance techniques that
capture IP addresses relating to Internet communications were
constitutionally indistinguishable from the pen registers approved
in Smith, because the IP addresses obtained were no more private
or intimate than phone numbers.3 The opinion reflects the current
34. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of text messages stored electronically by an
electronic communication service, and analogizing such messages to email content).
35. No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at **3-4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000); see also United States
v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information associated with his IP
address, which was already known to the government).
36. 495 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2007).
37. Id.
38. Id.; see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D. Mass. 2005) (stating that pen register surveillance of
website IP address communications, if carried out properly, would be "no problem" under
electronic communications statutes).
The court acknowledged in a footnote that surveillance techniques that reveal not only
website IP addresses but also Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) of the specific pages visited
"might be more constitutionally problematic," though it did not need to decide the issue.
Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049 n.6. URLs are the website addresses that direct users to a specific
page on a website. Id. See generally Marshall Brain, How Web Servers Work, http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/web-server.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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lack of constitutional protection for anything but clearly defined
Internet content.
Looking forward, it remains difficult to predict whether the
content/noncontent distinction will remain the central determinant
of constitutional protection for email and website communications.
As discussed below in Part IV.A, the content/noncontent distinction
was just one of several rationales given in Smith for finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone number information.
Smith also analogizes phone number information disclosed to the
phone company and appearing on monthly bills to information
disclosed to a third party (such as a government informant).39 This
"third party doctrine," if applied to email content and/or URLs, may
dictate that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy even in
the content of emails, which may be considered "disclosed" to third
party ISPs. However, despite the persistent ambiguity in the law
of Internet communications, the few courts that have thus far
examined the constitutional status of email and web surfing activity
have all relied heavily and often exclusively on the content/non-
content distinction in reaching their conclusions.
B. The Content/Noncontent Distinction in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act
The distinction between content and noncontent information is
critical in determining the level of statutory protection provided to
Internet communications.4 ° The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 (ECPA), which provides the statutory framework for
government surveillance of Internet communications, offers far
less protection to noncontent information than content infor-
mation in a variety of surveillance contexts.4 The Act includes three
sections-the Wiretap Act,42 which governs the interception of
39. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 48 (2004) (stating that the statutory protection for noncontent
information "could not differ more" from that provided for content information).
41. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
2009] 2117
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communications content in transit; the Pen Register Act,43 which
governs the interception of noncontent communications attributes
such as phone numbers and email to/from information; and the
Stored Communications Act, 4 which regulates retrospective access
to communications held in electronic storage. The following over-
view of the ECPA is not intended to be comprehensive; 45 instead, it
outlines the general function of the relevant statutes and highlights
the significance of the content/noncontent distinction in determining
the level of privacy protection provided by the Act.
1. The Wiretap Act-Interception of Communication Content
The Wiretap Act within the ECPA evolved from previous
legislation passed in 1968 regulating government and private wire-
tapping or bugging of "wire" or "oral" communications.46 In 1986, the
Wiretap Act was amended to include "electronic communications,"
defined as any "transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system" which is not a wire or oral communication.47 The Wiretap
Act imposes significant criminal penalties on anyone who intercepts
such communications (a minimum ten thousand dollar fine per
violation and up to five years imprisonment),4" though it provides no
exclusionary rule for evidence derived from electronic communica-
tions. It also requires the government to obtain a "super-warrant"
court order, including a showing that other investigative procedures
have failed or are likely to fail, a complete statement under oath of
facts and circumstances sufficient to justify a belief that the order
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2006).
45. For a detailed overview of the statutes governing electronic communications
surveillance, see for example, Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1375 (2004); Mulligan, supra note 26; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers
and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002).
46. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197, 211-25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522). Wire and oral communications
are telephone conversations or private face-to-face conversations that contain the human
voice. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)-(2).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
48. See id. §§ 2511, 2520.
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should issue, a particular description of the details of the suspected
crime, and a particularized description of the communications
sought.
49
The content/noncontent distinction in the Wiretap Act is found in
the definition of "intercept," which refers to the "acquisition of the
contents of any ... electronic... communication."" "Contents" appears
to be defined fairly broadly in the ECPA,51 as it consists of "any
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of [a]
communication. 52
The body of an email is considered content under the Wiretap
Act, and thus capable of interception.53 However, email content,
which is generally copied by ISP servers in the course of transmis-
sion to the recipient's ISP,54 is highly unlikely to be intercepted
under the Wiretap Act. Any "intercept" under the ECPA must occur
contemporaneously with transmission,5 and courts applying the
Wiretap Act to the acquisition of emails have concluded that even
email stored temporarily on an ISP's servers is in storage and not
in transmission within the meaning of the Act. 6 As a result of this
interpretation, the government has little motive to capture emails
during the fraction of a second when they are transmitted to or from
the ISP. By waiting until they are in storage on the ISP server, the
government can acquire the contents under the less stringent
standards of the Stored Communications Act.57
49. Id. § 2518(l)(b)-(c); see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA
Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 630 (2003) (discussing "super-
warrant" court orders).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (emphasis added).
51. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
53. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir.
1994).
54. See GRALLA, supra note 26, at 89; see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 (1986)
(discussing ISP copying of users' emails).
55. See United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976).
56. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003); Steve
Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62.
57. However, if URLs or website IP addresses were deemed to be "content" for the
purposes of the ECPA, a device set up to capture them as they are transmitted would actually
be intercepting them under the Wiretap Act. See IIT RESEARCH INST., INDEPENDENT
TECHmNCAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT, at C-5 (2000), available at
http://epic.orgprivacy/carnivore/carniv-final.pdf [hereinafter IITRI REPORT] (describing how
the government's Carnivore pen register surveillance software captures IP addresses and is
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2. The Pen Register Act-Interception of Noncontent
Communication Attributes
Created in 1986, the Pen Register Act initially applied to devices
that recorded outgoing and incoming telephone numbers on a
particular telephone line. A "pen register" records outgoing num-
bers, whereas a "trap and trace device" records the numbers of
persons calling the monitored line."8 The USA PATRIOT Act
amended the definition of pen registers and trap and trace devices
to include any "device or process" that records "dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information" (DRAS information), other
than content information, associated with an electronic communica-
tion.59
The Pen Register Act provides no exclusionary rule, and provides
for less significant criminal penalties than those in the Wiretap
Act.6" Instead of the Wiretap Act's heightened requirements, the Pen
Register Act mandates that courts "shall authorize" pen registers if
the government applicant certifies that the information likely to be
obtained is "relevant to an ongoing ... investigation."'" Courts
generally do not challenge or investigate the relevance certification,
and thus judicial review of pen register applicants is virtually
nonexistent in practice.62 The difference in the standards for court
approval of content-capturing wiretaps and noncontent-capturing
pen registers is dramatic-content information is protected by a
"super-warrant," noncontent information by a rubber stamp.
capable of capturing URLs); Kerr, supra note 49, at 645 n.180 (describing how Carnivore's
successor, DCS-1000, is also capable of capturing URLs). The interception would be subject
to the stringent regulations that apply to wiretaps, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006), rather than
the relatively lax standards governing the acquisition of noncontent information under the
Pen Register.
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (2006).
59. Id. ("[Captured information] shall not include the contents of any communication.").
60. Id. § 3121(d) (mandating fines "under this title" or imprisonment for not more than
one year for violations).
61. Id. § 3123(a), (c).
62. Freiwald, supra note 40, at 62.
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3. The Stored Communications Act-Retrospective Surveillance
of Content and Noncontent Information
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) protects emails and other
electronic communications that are not in the process of transmis-
sion.6" The SCA also provides for the disclosure of"record[s] or other
information," not including content, pertaining to a customer of
computing services." The SCA has no exclusionary rule, and its
penalties are less severe than those of the Wiretap or Pen Register
Acts-minimum fines of one thousand dollars and up to six months
imprisonment.6" The standard for court orders differs according to
the duration of electronic storage and whether the information
obtained is content or noncontent. At the highest level, ordering an
ISP to turn over the contents of electronic communications stored
for 180 days or less requires a standard search warrant.66 Communi-
cations contents stored for more than 180 days can be obtained
either with a standard warrant or a subpoena (or a § 2703(d) court
order) that must be coupled in most cases with prior notice to the
ISP subscriber.67 A subscriber who has been notified that his
personal information has been subpoenaed would likely have the
opportunity to challenge the subpoena on the grounds of irrelevance,
improper purpose, or procedural flaws.6" Numerous courts have
recently held that a privacy interest inherent in many personal
records (such as credit card or employment personnel records)
allows the subject of the records to challenge subpoenas issued to
third parties.69
63. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
64. Id. § 2703(c).
65. Id. § 2701(b).
66. Id. § 2703(a).
67. Id. § 2703(b); see id. § 2705 (providing that notice may be delayed for ninety days in
order to avoid "endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; ... flight from
prosecution; ... destruction of or tampering with evidence; ... intimidation of potential
witnesses; or ... otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial").
68. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964) (describing the criteria that
determine the validity of a subpoena).
69. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2459 n.7
(3d ed. 2008) (listing cases that recognize the right to challenge such subpoenas); see also
Reserve Solutions, Inc. v. Vernaglia, No. 05 Civ. 8622 VM RLE, 2006 WL 1788299, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 26,2006) (finding a personal privacy right in credit card records). See generally
Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964) (stating that interested third parties may attack
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At the lowest level, only a subpoena is required to compel an ISP
to disclose basic noncontent subscriber information, including name,
address, records of session times, length and type of subscription,
telephone number or network address, and source of payment
including credit card number.7 ° A somewhat higher level of protec-
tion is granted to "other" noncontent records pertaining to the
subscriber, a category that generally covers all transactional infor-
mation (such as phone usage records or records of email headers)
other than basic subscriber information.71 For these records, the
government must generally obtain a § 2730(d) court order, which
can be issued only if the government applicant provides "specific
and articulable facts" demonstrating "reasonable grounds to believe
that the [records] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation. 72 Ironically, this standard is significantly higher than
the standard governing Pen Register Act intercept orders, which
generally provides no judicial review and requires no showing of
specific and articulable facts. 7' The "reasonable grounds for rele-
vance" standard is lower than probable cause (and is akin to the
general relevance standard for subpoenas),74 but does provide some
degree ofjudicial scrutiny for noncontent record requests. 75 Still, the
standards for obtaining content in the ECPA, even content stored
for more than 180 days, are substantially higher than those for
noncontent. The lowest standard for obtaining stored content still
requires notice to the subscriber (and the corresponding opportunity
to challenge the surveillance); on the other hand, the highest
standard for noncontent information does not require notice to the
summonses before a district court and applying that rule to administrative hearings). Note
also that when a subscriber is notified that his or her records have been subpoenaed by the
government, the possibility of negative publicity for the ISP holding the records may
incentivize the ISP to bring its own challenge to the subpoena.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
71. See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTER AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 90-91 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
s&smanual2002.htm [hereinafter CCIPS MANUAL]; Mulligan, supra note 26, at 1567.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
73. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
74. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
75. See Anthony E. Orr, Note, Marking Carnivore's Territory: Rethinking Pen Registers
on the Internet, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 236 (2002).
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subscriber whose records are being observed.76 The statutory
protection afforded to electronic communication information
depends in large part on whether the information is classified as
content or noncontent information under the ECPA.
II. CONTENT AND NONCONTENT IN INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS
As discussed in Part I, whether communications information is
considered content or noncontent (attribute) information is perhaps
the most important determinant of the constitutional and statutory
protection which that information receives. Yet, whether Internet
communications should be classified as content or noncontent
remains, outside of certain well-defined categories (for instance, the
body of an email), a source of controversy and confusion among legal
scholars. The greatest of the content controversies has arisen over
the content status of web surfing information-the IP addresses of
websites and the URL addresses of the individual pages viewed.
Advocates of broad privacy protection have expressed concern that
URLs may reveal intimate personal information about web users,
77
but have largely focused on critiquing Smith v. Maryland's con-
tent/noncontent distinction 7' and the "third party doctrine" in
general.79 To them, the fact that URL data might be easily obtained
by the government is another piece of evidence that cases like Smith
are insufficiently protective of citizens' privacy interests.8 0 Yet by
76. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
77. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1264, 1287 (2004).
78. See, e.g., id. at 1286-88.
79. For the seminal third party doctrine case, also frequently criticized by advocates of
broader privacy protection, see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding that
a defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in banking records because they had
already been disclosed to the bank's employees in the ordinary course of business).
80. See Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records
and the Case for a "Crazy Quilt" of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH.
2, 21; Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data,
6 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. & L. REv. 61, 82-83 (2000); Solove, supra note 77, at 1288; Solove,
supra note 45, at 1137-38, 1156; Jayni Foley, Note, Are Google Searches Private? An
Originalist Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Online Communication Cases, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 447, 468-70 (2007); Peter J. Georgiton, Note, The FBI's Carnivore: How
Federal Agents May Be Viewing Your Personal Email and Why There Is Nothing You Can Do
About It, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1831, 1845-46 (2001).
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jumping to this normative conclusion, these scholars are inadver-
tently weakening their case for stronger Internet privacy protection
by failing to recognize the breadth of Internet communications data
that should be classified as content under constitutional and
statutory law. Meanwhile, supporters of a bright line definition of
content (and also many neutral observers) largely have not ad-
dressed the content status of web surfing information in any detail;
often, they simply assume that URLs and IP addresses should be
treated as noncontent data or assume that per Smith they are
obviously not protected by the Fourth Amendment, no matter what
their content status."' Probably as a result of these normative
biases, we lack a robust conceptual framework for determining
whether new forms of communications information, such as web
surfing data, should be classified as content or noncontent. Or
perhaps it is simply because determining whether web surfing
"communications" are content or not-and sorting out what that
would mean in terms of the Fourth Amendment and the ECPA-
presents a complex legal and technical question."
Determining whether different types of Internet communications
information are content requires decoupling the question of con-
tent/noncontent status from the question of whether the information
is protected under Smith. As discussed below, Smith may foreclose
a reasonable expectation of privacy in even intimate content if the
81. See Christopher Slogobin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J.
139, 153 (2005) (stating that courts are likely to find no reasonable expectation of privacy in
web surfing data); Rich Haglund, Note, Applying Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices to
Internet Communications: As Technology Changes, Is Congress or the Supreme Court Best-
Suited To Protect Fourth Amendment Expectations of Privacy?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 137,
141-42 (2003) (arguing that government software programs that collect web surfing data do
not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy); Christian David Hammel Schultz, Note,
Unrestricted Federal Agent: "Carnivore" and the Need To Revise the Pen Register Statute, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1241-42 (2001) (arguing that Smith dictates that there is no
expectation of privacy in web surfing data disclosed to a third party ISP); Brian I. Simon,
Note, The Tangled Web We Weave: The Internet and Standing Under the Fourth Amendment,
21 NOVA L. REV. 941, 967 (1997) (analogizing web surfing to traveling public streets and
arguing that there is no expectation of privacy in Internet browsing); see also Brief for
Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 6, United States v. Bach,
310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-2138) (making a similar argument that email content,
like a postcard, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
82. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 49, at 645; David McPhie, Almost Private: Pen Registers,
Packet Sniffers, and Privacy at the Margin, 2005 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 26; Solove, supra
note 77, at 1287.
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user is found to have disclosed the content to the carrier of the
communication (the ISP).8" But conflating Smith's analysis of the
content/noncontent distinction in telephone calls with its analysis
of a reasonable expectation of privacy in such calls risks obscuring
the question of what "content" actually is.
The following discussion seeks to develop a conceptual framework
capable of determining which types of Internet communications
information are content and which are noncontent. The inquiry
focuses on the semantic and/or common law definition of "content,"
presumably the relevant definition for the word as it is used in
Smith' and the lower court Fourth Amendment cases that focus on
the content/noncontent distinction in Internet communications.85
Note that although developing this framework will help determine
whether a type of Internet communication represents "contents"
under the ECPA,86 the statutory inquiry is technically separate
because "contents" and other relevant terms are separately defined
in the Act.
As a general semantic matter, the definition of "content" (and
"contents") has remained largely the same since before Smith was
decided. Indeed, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, it has
remained largely the same since the early sixteenth century.87
Commonly, the first meaning of "content" is "that which is con-
tained" in something; the second meaning is the "subject-matter" of
a speech or piece of writing; and the third meaning is the "sum or
substance of what is contained in a document; tenor, purport."8 As
we can see, content is generally defined as not only the actual
written words of a document, but also the general subject matter of
83. See infra Part IV.A.
84. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) ("Yet a pen register differs significantly
from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications.").
85. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 471 (6th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at **3-4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).
86. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
87. III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 815 (JA. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed.
1989).
88. Id. The meanings are the same in dictionaries published at the time of the Smith
decision. See, e.g., I SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 411 (William Little et al. eds., 3d
ed. 1977); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LANGUAGE 307 (David B.
Guralnik ed., 2d College ed. 1970). They remain the same today. See, e.g., ENCARTAWEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 413 (2d ed. 2004).
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the document and the purport of its message. Applied to the email
context, a very narrow definition of "contents" might refer to only
the actual letters contained in the body of the email; a more
expansive definition-like the one used in the ECPA89-would
include the overall gist of the message contained, or even the gen-
eral subject matter discussed. Although the distinction between
these narrow and broad definitions of content may be useful in
determining the status of web surfing information, it is ultimately
not central to determining whether most other forms of Internet
communication information are content or noncontent as a matter
of law. In any event, it is very likely that the term "content" as used
in Smith refers to the broader definition of "content" adopted by the
Wiretap Act; Smith approvingly quotes a 1977 Supreme Court
decision discussing how pen registers do not reveal the purport of
telephone communications.90
A. The Body of Email Messages
Emails are transmitted in "packets" of digitized information that
travel through the Internet's infrastructure, and these packets may
contain both email address ("header") and body text information.9
When the email reaches its destination server, the server reassem-
bles the information into the header and the body of the email.92
Yet, nothing about this transmission process implicates the content
status of the body itself in semantics or in constitutional law (or
under the ECPA). Setting aside questions of whether certain email
body information is protected by the Fourth Amendment,93 the
"message in the body of the email itself," like a letter or a phone
conversation,94 clearly constitutes the content of a communication.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006).
90. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159 (1977)).
91. Kerr, supra note 49, at 614-15.
92. Id. at 615.
93. See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 469 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532
F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacating the suit on ripeness grounds).
94. See Kerr, supra note 49, at 612.
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B. Email To/From Information
Email to/from routing information is contained in the header
portion of the email packet, and generally consists of email ad-
dresses, IP addresses, packet information, and information about
servers that are transmitting the email message.95 Though this sort
of information is used exclusively for directing emails and seems to
be directly analogous to noncontent phone number information,
some writers and privacy advocates have argued that it reveals
more personal information than do phone numbers, and therefore
should receive greater legal protection.96 Email addresses may, for
instance, indicate the identity of the communicators with more
specificity than phone numbers, which might be used by anyone in
a household.97 Depending on the domain name of the address, email
addresses may also reveal the communicator's workplace or
university affiliation. Certainly, the marginal increase in specificity
and the disclosure of a communicator's work or school affiliation
might represent a tiny increase in the invasiveness of email pen
registers relative to telephone pen registers." But none of the
information disclosed by an email address concerns the actual
content of any emails.99
95. For a sample email header containing such information, see id. at 612-13.
96. See Paul Taylor, Issues Raised by the Application of the Pen Register Statutes To
Authorize Government Collection of Information on Packet-Switched Networks, 6 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 4, 4 (2001); Robert Ditzion, Note, Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age: The
Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1321, 1341 (2004); Georgiton, supra note
80, at 1845-46; Kevin Butler, Is Big Brother Surfing the Internet? FBI's 'Carnivore' Raises
Privacy Issue, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Aug. 9,2000, at A22, available at http://www.investors.
comleditorialcontent.asp?secid=1501&status=article&id=160428&secure=7406 (quoting pri-
vacy advocates' arguments that Smith does not apply to email headers).
97. See Georgiton, supra note 80, at 1846. But see Kerr, supra note 49, at 643.
98. Of course, anyone with access to a person's computer could send an email from their
address, assuming the person uses Microsoft Outlook or another email service that activates
without a password. Neither phone numbers nor email addresses identify a user with 100
percent certainty, yet both will identify a user in the great majority of cases. The differences
are slight.
99. Note that one could make a "hyper-literal" argument that under the narrowest
definition of contents, only email and website IP addresses are truly envelope information,
because every other byte of information is contained in the packets transmitted to these
addresses. See Kerr, supra note 49, at 614-15. Under this conception of content versus
envelope, email addresses and URLs would be considered content because they are
"contained" in packets. Though this might provide robust protection for Internet communi-
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To be sure, government investigators might be able to make
educated guesses as to the purpose of an email (or a phone call)
between two parties, 00 for example, a known drug addict and a
known drug dealer. But one cannot argue that such to/from
information actually reveals the contents of communications. Of
course, observing the addressing information very likely reveals the
identities of the communicators. But even that information does not
reveal the details (or even the purpose or subject) of the communica-
tion itself-two people might talk about any subject. As even most
proponents of additional privacy protection acknowledge, email
to/from information should not be considered content.' 01
C. Subscriber Information
Internet users often provide personal and billing information to
their ISP in the course of subscribing for Internet services."0 2 This
cations data, it would be contrary to the current constitutional approach to content questions.
See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2007); Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455, 471 (6th Cir. 2007). It would also be contrary to Congress's
definition of "contents" in the ECPA, which emphasizes the "substance, purport, or meaning"
of a communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006). This body of law reflects an "analogy"
approach to Internet communications, in which courts seek to determine the content status
of information based on whether it concerns or reveals the meaning of a communication; in
other words, courts seek to determine if the information is more like letter text or envelope
information. See Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049-50. This Article follows this thus-far dominant
means of content analysis. The "hyper-literal" approach would also be entirely technology
dependent and confined to current Internet technologies. For all of these reasons, no scholar
has, to my knowledge, proposed a packet-based approach.
On the wisdom of applying existing legal frameworks rather than creating new legal
regimes for each new technology, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208-10. For additional discussion on the issues of analogy
and perspective in Internet law, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995); Orin S.
Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO L.J. 357 (2003).
100. See Kerr, supra note 49, at 643. The Mosaic theory of data gathering suggests that,
given a sufficient number of disparate bits of data, the government may be able to glean a
great deal of information about an interaction between two parties under investigation. See
Berman v. CIA, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2005). Nonetheless, such information
would not include the substantive content of the interaction, and there is good reason to be
skeptical of any entity's ability to form concrete or reliable conclusions by gathering and
combining numerous bits of innocuous data. See David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory,
National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628,654,664-66 (2005).
101. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 40, at 60.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999). Note
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information, which may include credit card or social security
numbers, certainly implicates whatever privacy interests consumers
have in their personal financial information." 3 But information
about a subscriber has no bearing on the actual contents of mes-
sages, except perhaps as subscriber identity relates to government
investigators making guesses about the subject matter of content
based on email to/from information. Those concerns, which ulti-
mately have no bearing on the classification of such information as
noncontent, are discussed above.1" 4
D. Email Size and Text Length
The government's pen register information collection soft-
ware-formerly called "Carnivore" and now called "DCS-1000, ' 5
does not collect an email's subject line, but it does replace the text
in the subject line with Xs, allowing a viewer to know how many
letters were used in the subject."0 6 The government's pen register
surveillance programs may also collect information about the total
size of email transmissions."' To be sure, the length of an email or
email subject line (or a phone call, to which the same argument
would apply) can tell an observer something about the email
itself. '8 The size of an email might also indicate that a file of that
size has been attached to the email. Conceivably, authorities
investigating a child pornographer might guess that he was sending
child pornography images in captured emails of a certain size.'0 9 But
the size of the file does not actually indicate or rule out any specific
content; it does not reveal whether a file exists or whether the file
that free ISPs often do not require any personal information about their subscribers. See, e.g.,
Dana L. Bazelon, Yun Jung Choi & Jason F. Conaty, Computer Crimes, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
259, 290 n.241 (2006).
103. See, e.g., Reserve Solutions, Inc. v. Vernaglia, No. 05 Civ. 8622 VM RLE, 2006 WL
1788299, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 69, § 2459 n.7.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
105. See Manton M. Grier, Jr., Comment, The Software Formerly Known as "Carnivore"
When Does E-Mail Surveillance Encroach Upon a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 52 S.C.
L. REV. 875, 875 & n.2 (2001).
106. IITRI REPORT, supra note 57, at C-3.
107. See id.; Grier, Jr., supra note 105, at 886.
108. McPhie, supra note 82, at 33.
109. Grier, Jr., supra note 105, at 886-87.
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is an image or a similarly sized file of another type, and it certainly
does not reveal anything about the content of the hypothetical
image."O Neither does the length of a line of text reveal the content
of the text, nor its subject matter or purport. Guessing the content
of even a three-letter subject heading would be impossible to do with
any accuracy; not counting acronyms or punctuation (for example,
"hi!"), there are still hundreds of distinct three-letter words."'
Though it may be unnerving to know that the government can
determine the length of one's emails with a pen register, mere
information about the length of emails should not be considered
content.
E. Email Subject Headers
The subject line of an email, unlike the Internet communication
categories discussed above, cannot be directly compared to any
feature of regular mail. It contains communicative writing and
does not contain any routing information, but it is transmitted in
the header portion of email packets.' 2 As such, it would probably
not qualify as content under the very narrowest definition of the
"contents" of a message. It appears on the external header portion
of the email; only the body of the email is "contained" in the pack-
aging that is the email header. Nonetheless, both the Department
of Justice and the one district court to have commented on the
matter have concluded that the subject header, despite its location
in an email transmission, should be treated as content."13
110. In this way it can be roughly analogized to the weight of a package sent through the
mail. This information is not considered content, and it has been definitively excluded from
Fourth Amendment protection since 1877. See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); see
also United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2007).
111. There are, for instance, 972 words on the Scrabble three-letter word list at San Jose
Scrabble Club No. 21, Three-Letter Word List, http://www.yak.net/kablooey/scrabble/
3letterwords.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
112. Kerr, supra note 49, at 613.
113. CCIPS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 91; In re Application of the United States for an
Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45,48 (D. Mass. 2005). Both the
DOJ and the district court opinion refer to the ECPA, but their reasoning strongly suggests
that email subject lines should also be considered content for the purposes of constitutional
law. Again, this issue is wholly separate from the issue of whether subject line content is
protected under the Fourth Amendment.
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The House Report on the USA PATRIOT Act and the PATRIOT
Act's amendments to the ECPA, state that subject lines are "clearly
content." '114 Likely as a result, the Department of Justice's policy is
to treat email subject lines as content.1 5 Neither the Department's
policy nor the House's legislative history give a reason for their
interpretation; they simply consider email subject lines to be 'letter"
information despite their location. Under this rationale, the subject
line would be just another form of email body text. This rationale is
sound, and it provides an attractive bright line rule. Any informa-
tion that is not used in routing a communication, and which itself
may contain communicative text (for example, 'The White Sox
won"), is 'letter" content, regardless of its location in the packet of
data actually transferred between ISPs.
Email subject lines might also be considered contents to the
extent that they obviously disclose the subject and purport of the
body of the communication. In a recent district court case involving
a pen register application, the magistrate judge found that, while
the subject line was contained in the email header, the "information
contained in the 'subject' would reveal the contents of the communi-
cation and would not be properly disclosed pursuant to a pen
register or trap and trace device" under the ECPA." 6 This alterna-
tive ground is not necessary for the framework advocated here
(which proposes that email subject lines are essentially the
equivalent of body text), but the court's argument is sound as well,
especially given the broad definition of "contents" in the ECPA. l7
III. SEPARATING CONTENT FROM NONCONTENT IN WEB BROWSING
COMMUNICATIONS
Like emails, the transmission of website data on the Internet
occurs via packets of digitized information.1 ' When an Internet user
114. H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt.1, at 53 (2001).
115. CCIPS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 112 (stating that the subject line "can contain
content"); see also Kerr, supra note 49, at 613.
116. In re Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006) (defining "contents" as "any information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of [a] communication").
118. See Kerr, supra note 49, at 614-15. The following brief description of how website
communication works is, of course, a simplified account. For a detailed description of how
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types in or navigates to a URL, the URL's domain name (for
example "www.nytimes.com") is translated during transmission into
the IP address of the target website." 9 Specific website routing
information, like the individual page URL, is generally placed inside
the packet transmitted to the target's IP address,120 just as email
to/from address information is generally placed inside packets,
along with body text.12" ' The packet is sent to a website host com-
puter's IP address.'22 The host computer processes the URL
information in this packet and uses it to select the web page
requested.123 It then sends the website data to the user's com-
puter. 1
24
This relatively simple process gives rise to many complex legal
and semantic questions as to whether courts should consider any or
all Internet communication information content, and further,
whether courts should protect this information under the Fourth
Amendment. The first of these questions is whether communica-
tions between a person and a website host computer should be
considered communications at all.
The question is essentially confined to constitutional law because
the extremely broad definition of "electronic communications,"
which the ECPA defines as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
... data, or intelligence of any nature," appears to encompass web
surfing activities.125 As for the constitutional issue, it appears that
web surfing transmissions will similarly be treated as a form of
communication, analogous in constitutional law to telephone
Internet transmissions work, see for example, PETE LOSHIN, TCP/IP CLEARLY EXPLAINED (3d
ed. 1999).
119. See Brain, supra note 38.
120. See Ditzion, supra note 96, at 1330-31.
121. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
122. See Ditzion, supra note 96, at 1330-32.
123. See Brain, supra note 38; see also Ditzion, supra note 96, at 1331-32 (describing how
Internet pen register software must filter through packets in order to obtain email and URL
information).
124. See Brain, supra note 38; Ditzion, supra note 96, at 1331-32.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining "electronic communication" as "any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system"
that is not a wire or oral communication); see, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329
F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a website transmission is an electronic communication
under the ECPA); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
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conversations. Communicative data (such as website content,
personal information, and blog comments) is transferred back and
forth between Internet users and automated website hosts.
126
Current law provides no reason to believe that the constitutional
protection for the content of communications is diminished because
one part of the communication is automated or available to the
public.' 27 Courts have already implicitly treated telephone calls to
an automated, voice recognition-based service as communications
in which callers may have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to
the content of their calls.128 In other words, there is no indication
that websites sent to users are not considered communications just
because they are transmitted by automated processes rather than
other human beings-after all, a living person wrote them and
posted them at some point. 129 Accordingly, the one court to have
addressed the issue has applied the Fourth Amendment "communi-
cations" framework of Smith to web surfing activities." A number
of scholars have also considered web surfing activity to be a
communication for the purposes of constitutional law.' 3' Still, a far
more difficult question remains: which parts of this communication
are content and which are not?
A. Website Text and Other Data Sent to Users; Data Input by
Users and Sent to the Web Host
The question of whether website text transmitted to an Internet
user or an Internet user's input data transmitted to a web host
computer represents "content" is essentially answered once the
transmissions are recognized as communications. As with email
126. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 876.
127. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. Authorizing (1) Installation of Use of a Pen
Register, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that digits dialed to communicate
with an automated telephone system constitute call content). Presumably the government
could not intercept the contents of phone calls to automated lines with only a pen register
order just because the line is automated.
128. See, e.g., id.
129. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 876.
130. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2007).
131. See supra notes 80-81; see also Kerr, supra note 49, at 646-47 (discussing the novel
category of human-computer interactions but assuming that such interactions are
communications).
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communications, the "body" of a web surfing communication is the
nonrouting information contained in the digitized packets trans-
ferred over the Internet.132 Data that is input by users, including
search terms typed into a search "box" on a web page, has been
recognized by courts as content, at least as that term is defined in
the ECPA.133 Because website transmissions are communications,13 4
the text and other information sent by websites to users is very
likely to be treated as the contents of a communication for the
purposes of statutory and constitutional law. As even proponents of
a narrow reading of "content" have acknowledged, the nonrouting
information in Internet packets represents Internet communications
content.
1 35
B. URLs Containing Search Terms
A great deal of the confusion over the content/noncontent status
of URLs in general1 36 may be the result of a fixation among courts
and commentators on the status of URLs that include search terms.
This section examines the process of using search terms to navigate
the Web and discusses the arguments concerning the content status
of search term URLs.
When a user types search terms into a box on a search engine's
website, the user is not actually searching the entire Internet. 137
Instead, the user is directed to a page displaying the results of a
search of the website's database.1 38 This occurs when the user's
Internet browser adds the search terms into the URL sent to the
website, which sends back the requested results page based on the
132. Colloquially, the text, video, or audio portion of a website is generally referred to as
its "web content." See, e.g., Web-Designz, What is Web Content and Why Is It So Important?,
http://www.web-designz.com/tutorialslwebsite-planning/web-content.shtml (last visited Mar.
11, 2009).
133. See In re Application of the U.S. for an order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register,
396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D. Mass 2005).
134. See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
135. See Kerr, supra note 49, at 615 tbl.1.
136. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
137. See SHARI THUROW, SEARCH ENGINE VISIBILTY 11 (2003).
138. Id. at 15.
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URL.'39 Indeed, typing the JRL containing the search terms directly
into an Internet browser takes one to the same results page.
As in the case of email subject lines, the arguments that search
terms embedded in a URL are content could take two forms, one
reflecting a very narrow definition of content, and the other
reflecting the broad definition used in the ECPA. First, one could
argue that the terms in the UIRL are actually the body text of a
communication contained by the rest of the URL. Yet the terms in
the URL are placed on the "envelope" of the Internet communica-
tion, and are not technically typed by the user (they are placed in
the URL by the browser, which copies the text typed into the web
page form). They are used for website routing just like any other
URL information.14 It would be difficult to argue that the search
terms in a URL are literally contained like the text of a letter.141
Instead, both courts and scholars have focused on the argument
that URLs containing search terms reveal the content of the user's
input to the website, thus exposing that input and the subject and
purpose of the entire communication.142 In one recent district court
ruling, the magistrate held that URLs containing search terms had
the potential to reveal the subject and purpose of communications,
and therefore such URLs must be treated as contents under the
broader definition used in the ECPA.14 3 Otherwise, pen registers
139. See Robert Berkowitz, Packet Sniffers and Privacy: Why the No-Suspicion-Required
Standard in the USA Patriot Act Is Unconstitutional, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 1, 16 (2002).
140. By contrast, an email subject line is directly typed by the user rather than translated
by a browser, and is not used to route the email communication.
141. See Matthew A. Goldberg, Comment, The Googling of Online Privacy: Gmail, Search-
Engine Histories and the New Frontier of Protecting Private Information on the Web, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 249, 265 (2005) ("Mhe URL that results from the search, the one containing
your search term, is unmistakably a Web site address that tells the computer where to go, or
at least what to do. The fact that one can easily copy the URL resulting from a particular
search and re-enter it at a later time to retrieve a substantially similar page of search results
supports a view of the URL as routing or addressing information.").
142. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 2005); Bellia, supra note 45, at 1429 ("Though the
URL only represents the location on [a web] server of a file generated in response to the
search and containing the results of the search, it gives significant clues as to what that file
contains."); Solove, supra note 77, at 1287 (stating the URLs can reveal user searches); see
also In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting that a
company records "contents" under the ECPA when it records URLs that include personal
information input in a form).
143. In re Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 49-50.
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could capture all of a user's search term information simply by
capturing the URLs sent from his IP address.'
Perhaps because it is so intuitive that search terms in a URL
should be considered content, the treatment of content-revealing
communications data is undertheorized in computer surveillance
scholarship. Indeed, by focusing on URLs containing search terms,
privacy scholars may be promoting a sort of "search term exception."
Courts and commentators developing such an exception might
conclude that URLs containing search terms are contents, but such
URLs present a relatively rare and exceptional case. 4
This Article argues that the creation of a search term exception' 4'
would be the product of an erroneous understanding of the legal
status of URLs. As discussed below,'47 a focus on search terms
obscures the functional and legal similarities between URLs
containing search terms and those that do not.
C. URLs
Setting aside the question of Fourth Amendment protection, this
Section argues that standard URLs qualify as content information
for the purposes of constitutional law. They reveal every bit as much
content as do URLs containing search terms. And peripheral,
noncontent information that inevitably reveals underlying content
is treated as content itself, under existing common and constitu-
tional law. 4' The failure to introduce this "content revealing"
principle to Internet law would result in a drastic underprotection
of private communications. Further, the recognition that Internet
communications (such as URLs) represent content has the potential
to clarify other aspects of the constitutional and statutory law that
governs Internet privacy. This section examines first the practical
144. See id. at 49.
145. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator's Guide To Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1228 n.142 (2004); see also
Solove, supra note 77, at 1286-88 (criticizing Kerr's views on Internet privacy, but accepting
the idea that only URLs with search terms need be protected as content); Goldberg, supra
note 141, at 266-67 (arguing that users have a unique privacy interest in search terms).
146. Cf. In re Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 49-50 (specifically including search terms in
a list of "contents" that are off limits to an approved pen register).
147. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
148. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
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arguments, and then the legal arguments, that lead to the above
conclusions.
1. What Standard URLs Reveal
By focusing on the more obvious fact that URLs containing search
terms reveal user input communications, many scholars have
ignored or given insufficient attention to the fact that all URLs
reveal underlying web surfing communications,'49 exposing the
website content requested by and sent to users.
A conventional URL inevitably discloses its corresponding website
content. 150 Government investigators (or hackers, for that matter)
using a pen register to capture URLs as they are transmitted, or
even receiving the URL data a short amount of time after the user
herself transmits it, have surely obtained as a practical matter the
content transmitted and viewed. The fact that they have to copy the
URL from their pen register program and paste it into their
Internet browser to extrapolate the website text itself does not
change the fact that, in practice, the secret is out once the URL is
obtained.' 5 '
149. Those scholars that have mentioned the fairly well-known fact that URLs point
anyone who obtains them to the website that a user is viewing have not analyzed the legal
implications of this fact. Instead, they have offered this fact as evidence that either the
current constitutional surveillance framework is flawed, see, e.g., Solove, supra note 77, at
1287 (focusing on search terms and the need for a rethinking of Smith), or merely as evidence
that the current constitutional and statutory law dealing with pen registers is not up to the
task of determining the content status of Internet communications. See, e.g., Bellia, supra
note 45, at 1429-30; Ditzion, supra note 96, at 1338-39.
150. Note that some website content, such as the text a user has entered into a website
form, is encrypted when transmitted as URL data and is not revealed by the encrypted URL.
Also, an Internet user exploring a web page may be able to activate some forms of web content
without navigating to a new page and generating a new URL-although the user's web
history would include the original page's URL. This section focuses on the standard
URL/website configuration, in which a unique URL corresponds to a specific web page (or, as
with search pages or other pages with dynamic content, a specific result generated by the
host's database). Unconventional website configurations do not significantly impact the
practice of Internet navigation or alter the fact that a URL history reveals the content
requested by and sent to an Internet user. As such, they do not affect this section's analysis.
These unique website forms and their implications for Internet surveillance law are discussed
in Appendix 1.
151. Given the ability of virtually any American to access the Internet in his or her local
public library, disclosing the URL of a website can be said to reveal to anyone what that
website contains in roughly the same way that revealing a phrase coded into Pig Latin (for
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Indeed, even URL data obtained from ISP records days, months,
or years after the user engaged in the recorded web surfing
generally reveals the contents of the web pages sent and viewed.
First, many article-specific URLs will not change for years, and can
lead investigators directly to the article viewed.152 Second, even for
websites like blogs whose content is updated more frequently,
private and governmental organizations (including the Library of
Congress) have archived previously posted websites and made their
content available to the public.153 The most extensive and easily
accessible means of determining the content of a website on a
specific past date is the Internet Archive, a website that provides
free public access to a database of archived websites.5 4 Although the
Archive cannot capture every single web page on the Internet every
day, it frequently (from multiple times per day to every other day)
archives the most popular sites and infrequently (roughly once per
two months) archives smaller, less popular (and probably less likely
to be updated) websites.1 55 Thus, an observer who knew that a user
entered a URL into her Internet browser on a certain date could
enter the URL into the Internet Archive and search for that date in
the results. 56 Using this method, an observer could often determine
precisely the content an Internet user viewed at a given URL--for
example, the URL of the Libertarian Party's blog on February 2,
2006.157 Finally, in the rare case that the content of a web page
example, "ill-bay s-iay opping-shay t-ay ome-hay epot-day") reveals that phrase to anyone who
can decode Pig Latin. Similarly, disclosing a word in a code substituting the numbers 1 to 26
for the 26 letters of the alphabet reveals the word to anyone who knows the code (e.g.,
"[8] [5] [12] [12] [15]"). The coded phrase itself is nonsense, but decoding it is obvious and takes
only a few seconds. Cutting and pasting a URL from a spreadsheet into a web browser would
be equally obvious to any Internet user, and would take roughly the same amount of time.
152. For example, URLs cited in a 2003 Orin Kerr law review article direct an Internet
user to the same government, educational, and private web pages that they did in 2003. See,
e.g., Kerr, supra note 49, at 610 n.13 (http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalk
ing.htm, last modified in 2003); id. at 612 n.20 (http://www.cs.indiana.edudocproject/
bdgttifbdgtti_6.html); id. at 614 n.32 (http://www.ictp.trieste.itJ-radionet/nucl996/ refltcpip/,
a paper written in 1996).
153. Beryl A. Howell, Proving Web History: How To Use the Internet Archive, J. INTERNET
L., Feb. 2006, at 3-4.
154. See id.; Internet Archive, http://www.archive.orglindex.php (last visited Mar. 11,
2009).
155. See Howell, supra note 153, at 4.
156. Id. at 5.
157. See Archive of LP Blog: The Official Blog of the Libertarian Party, Feb. 2, 2006,
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could not be ascertained using the above methods, the government
would likely be able simply to subpoena the web host for its
archived content records, requesting that it disclose the information
that it displayed on a certain date when a certain URL was
entered." 8 In virtually all cases, there would be little practical
obstacle to a government investigator obtaining the content
information associated with even years-old URLs.
Further, the information revealed about user inputs is generally
the same regardless of whether URLs containing search terms are
recorded.'59 Standard URLs frequently reveal the same infor-
mation.16 ° As an example, imagine that Alice Sebold's recent
bestseller The Lovely Bones was not a novel, but rather the mani-
festo of a subversive political group disfavored by the government.
Suppose that a user under investigation by the government for her
political activities' 6 ' searched for the book and then clicked on the
book's web page in order to see its publication details or to purchase
it. Government investigators (or hackers) obtaining a URL with
search terms sent to Amazon.com would know that the user was
looking for "lovely bones" and would be able to visit the book's page
by clicking on it in the Amazon results page that the following URL
http://web.archive.org/web/20060203121340/http://www.lp.orglyourturn/ (last visited Mar. 11,
2009).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
159. Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1283, 1311-12 (2005).
160. Id.
161. Recall that there is no judicial review of court order applications for pen registers. See
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2006); Freiwald, supra note 40, at 48-49. And, if obtaining URLs is not
a search under the Fourth Amendment, the government might obtain one's URLs for a variety
of purposes. Government entities continue to show interest in monitoring the political and
social activities of private citizens and interest groups. See Lisa Rein & Josh White, More
Groups Than Thought Monitored in Police Spying, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2009, at A01. One
particularly nefarious potential use of the ability to obtain URLs would be to leak to the press
the URL history of a public figure whom the government wishes to discredit. Imagine that a
government investigator obtained and leaked the URL history of a candidate from the
opposition party for the purpose of discrediting him or her-if the candidate has ever visited
any politically controversial or pornographic sites, or entered any suspicious sounding Google
searches (even for wholly legitimate purposes), such a leak could cause massive embar-
assment or even a career-ending scandal. In other words, the government's ability to obtain
our URL data for any purpose has implications far beyond the potential use of URLs in
criminal prosecutions.
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directs them to: http://www.amazon.con/s/ref=nb-ss gw?url=search-
alias%3Daps&field-keywords= lovely+bones."'
Imagine that the search term URL could not be obtained for
technical or legal reasons. Investigators or hackers obtaining only
the URL of the book's page at Amazon.com would also know from
reading the URL that the user was looking for the novel 'lovely
bones," and would be able to visit the book's page once they obtained
the URL: http://www.amazon.com/Lovely-Bones-Novel-Alice-Sebold/
dp/0316666343.
163
By contrast, Barnes and Noble's book page for The Lovely Bones
does not provide the name of the book in the URL. 114 Nonetheless,
investigators or hackers would easily be able to ascertain which
book the user was looking for by visiting the book's web page at its
URL: http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbninquiry.asp
?ean=0316666343. 165
The text in the three URLs differs; but, search terms or not, the
three URLs all reveal to any observer with Internet access the same
information: the user has requested and accessed the web page of
The Lovely Bones. Only by blinding oneself to the realities of how
URLs work could one argue that one of these URLs is meaningfully
different from another in practice. Of course, this practical conclu-
sion is not the end of the content inquiry under the law. The law
may emphasize the form of communications over their function,
and thereby require us to treat routing information as noncontent
even when it reveals the entirety of a communication. The following
sections argue that it does not.
2. Analogous Areas of Content/Noncontent Law
Internet surveillance law has not yet explicitly resolved the status
of forms of information such as URLs, which do not themselves
literally contain content (at least under the narrower definition of
162. Amazon.com: Books: Lovely Bones, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb-ss.gwurl=
search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=lovely+bones (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
163. Amazon.com: The Lovely Bones: Alice Sebold, http://www.amazon.com/Lovely-Bones-
Novel-Alice-Seboldldp/0316666343 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
164. The Lovely Bones, Alice Sebold - Barnes & Noble, http://search.barnesandnoble.com/
booksearchisbninquiry.asp?ean=0316666343 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
165. Id.
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the term), but which completely reveal the content of the underlying
communication.'66 It is entirely possible that courts may come to the
practically absurd conclusion that URLs containing search terms
that reveal content information should be treated as content, but
URLs without search terms that reveal content information should
not.'67 It should not come as a surprise, however, that in areas of
law that are better developed than Internet surveillance, the law
does not allow the government or private parties to obtain wholly
noncontent information that inevitably reveals the contents of
protected communications. 16
8
Privilege law provides one such example. To be sure, privilege law
is not directly applicable to Internet surveillance; Fourth Amend-
ment protection and common law evidentiary privilege are, of
course, different things. And while it is well-established that the
contents of privileged communications are legally protected, it is
still unclear whether the contents of web surfing communications
will ultimately receive constitutional protection.'69 Yet privilege law
faces the same problems of content/noncontent classification, and
it can offer helpful guidance to a court attempting to determine
whether URL information that reveals potentially protected com-
munications content should itself be treated as content.
In privilege law, peripheral, noncontent facts about an attorney-
client or doctor-patient communication (such as the identity of a
client or attorney or the fact of a consultation) are generally not
protected, even if the facts alone can be used as evidence against a
defendant. 7 ° By contrast, the contents of communications are
protected.'7 ' However, when the contents of a communication will
obviously be exposed by the disclosure of the peripheral information,
the peripheral information itself is treated as content, receiving the
same protection as the underlying content that it reveals.'72 This is
166. See Foley, supra note 80, at 458.
167. See Kerr, supra note 49, at 646.
168. See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962).
169. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
170. See Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Behrens v. Hironimus,
170 F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948) (attorney-client privilege); City of Alhambra v. Superior
Court, 168 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (doctor-patient privilege).
171. See, e.g., Behrens, 170 F.2d at 628.
172. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (DeGuerin), 926 F.2d 1423, 1431 (5th Cir. 1991) ('If
the disclosure of the client's identity will also reveal the confidential purpose for which he
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true even where the "substance of a disclosure" (analogous to a web
page's content) is already exposed but the peripheral information
linking it to the defendant (analogous to the URL information sent
from an Internet user's computer) is not yet known.'73
For example, in DeGuerin, the Fifth Circuit found that disclosure
of peripheral noncontent information-the identity of a third party
who retained an attorney on behalf of an indigent drug dealer-
would render obvious the content of the communication and the
motivation of the third party in seeking the attorney.'74 In other
words, it would reveal that the third party was a drug lord. As a
result, the court held that the noncontent information was protected
under the attorney client privilege, "because disclosure would allow
the Government to obtain information given ... as part of a confiden-
tial communication.' 75
The protected content itself need not be the literal words ex-
changed; if the purport of the protected communication would be
revealed by the peripheral information, then courts protect the
peripheral information. 76 Much like URLs, peripheral information
about attorney-client relationships that reveals underlying content
is "connected inextricably with a privileged communication-the
confidential purpose" behind the actual words exchanged. 177 The
same general principles apply in the doctor-patient privilege
context. The mere fact that a doctor-patient consultation occurred
becomes privileged if that noncontent fact "discloses the nature of
the condition for which the patient sought treatment."'78 The
principle holds regardless of whether the mere fact of consultation
itself discloses the protected communication, or if the communica-
consulted an attorney, we protect both the confidential communication and the client's
identity as privileged."); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1491 (10th
Cir. 1990) (identifying a "confidential communication exception" to the general rule that
noncontent information is unprotected, and citing supportive cases from the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
173. Dole, 889 F.2d at 889.
174. DeGuerin, 926 F.2d at 1431-32.
175. Id. at 1432.
176. See, e.g., Anderson, 906 F.2d at 1492 (stating that the exception is generally applied
when "the mere identification of the client would [disclose] the confidential communication
from the client that he had committed the crime for which he sought advice").
177. DeGuerin, 926 F.2d at 1431.
178. City of Alhambra v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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tion could obviously, and would inevitably, "be inferred" from the
peripheral fact.1 9
The principles of the "confidential communications exception" for
noncontent information in privilege law can be applied in the URL
context. As discussed above, URLs obviously "allow the Government
to obtain" underlying communicative information.8 0 The well-
established, analogous principles of privilege law strongly suggest
that URLs should be treated as content and should receive the
same protections that the actual text of Internet communications
receive.18' Further, like some peripheral information regarding
attorney-client or doctor-patient communications, URLs reveal (and
may even contain text indicating) the subject matter or purpose of
an underlying communication.'82 Indeed, UIRLs reveal more, and
more specific, information about the content of the underlying
communications.8 3 They expose not only the purport of communica-
tions but the very text of the communications themselves."8
Again, the authority of the privilege law cases dealing with
content-revealing information is persuasive, not precedential, in the
Internet communications context. Yet, if courts fail to apply these
principles, Internet surveillance law will be the only area of the law
in which peripheral information that entirely reveals the underlying
content of a communication is not treated as content information
itself. No other branch of law has thus far countenanced the
practically absurd result that the government or a private party
may discover potentially protected contents by obtaining noncontent
information that reveals those contents. 8 5
179. Id. (citing Marcus v. Superior Court, 95 Ca. Rptr. 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)).
180. DeGuerin, 926 F.2d at 1432.
181. See id. at 1431; Anderson, 906 F.2d at 1491.
182. McPhie, supra note 82, at 29.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. For an additional line of cases dealing with revealing noncontent information outside
the communication context, see, e.g., Shelton v. Am. Motors Co., 805 F.2d 1323, 1329-30 (11th
Cir. 1986) (holding that the mere fact of the selection of documents examined by an attorney
would, if disclosed, reveal the content of the attorney's mental impressions about the case);
United States v. Cook, No. CR05-0424-TSZ, 2006 WL 3474184, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 16,
2006) (holding that the mere fact of selection of documents in attorney's binder revealed the
attorney's mental processes, and was therefore protected work product).
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3. The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment "Content"
Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court, much like courts applying the law of
evidentiary privilege, has had to decide how to treat peripheral
information that is generally unprotected, but reveals protected
information. The relevant cases are those that deal with the use of
new technologies employed to surveil citizens in unique ways-
United States v. Kaross and Kyllo v. United States.187 It is important
to clarify what is argued here. This section makes neither the
debatable claim that the principles of Kyllo dictate that the Court
must limit the holding of Smith;ss nor does it make the wholly
implausible claim that the Kyllo Court actually intended to abandon
Smith."5 9 Nor does it argue that Kyllo applies to URLs, which could
be said to reveal the details of activities in a home. 9 ° Kyllo deals
with "physical intrusion" (or its technological equivalents) and
physical activity taking place in the uniquely protected area of the
home. 9' It is not within the line of constitutional cases that
specifically deal with communications directed outside of the home,
and there is no indication that the Court intended it to be authorita-
tive in the communications area.'92
Nonetheless, it would be a serious error to think that the prin-
ciples of Kyllo and Karo are wholly irrelevant to the constitutional
status of Internet communications. Indeed, these cases stand for
the proposition that peripheral information that reveals protected
content must itself be treated as content information. In Kyllo,
186. 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
187. 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
188. See Tracey Macin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection
in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 97-101, 136-37 (2002) (arguing that obtaining
telephone number or email address information should be held to violate Kyllo); Ric Simmons,
From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century
Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1341-43 (2002) (arguing that courts should disregard
Smith and apply an "intimate nature" test derived from Kyllo to determine whether disclosed
information should be protected by the Fourth Amendment). But see Solove, supra note 45,
at 1152-53 (criticizing the "intimate nature" test as vague and unworkable).
189. Cf. Maclin, supra note 188, at 100 (stating that the Kyllo Justices did not appear to
consider Smith while deciding Kyllo and would likely uphold Smith).
190. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35.
191. Id. at 34.
192. See Maclin, supra note 188, at 100.
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government agents used a thermal imaging device to scan heat
emanating from a suspect's house, and determined based on the
results that the suspect was "using halide lights to grow marijuana
in his house.""19 The government argued that it had only observed
heat radiating outside the house, which was not itself protected by
the Fourth Amendment. 19 4 But the Court rejected this "mechanical
interpretation," observing that the distinction between "off-the-wall"
and "through-the-wall" thermal surveillance in such cases is without
substance, because both types of surveillance reveal the same
protected information. 9 5 The Court held that the use of the device
allowed the government to explore details of the home that would
generally only be discoverable upon physical intrusion, and had
therefore effected a Fourth Amendment search of the suspect's
home. 196
Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the government's ac-
quisition of external information-the heat emanating from a
house---could not be protected by the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore the majority had wrongly held that the "inference" made
by the government agents was the unconstitutional search. 97 A
similar argument could be made about URLs that do not contain
search terms: the URLs themselves contain no body text, and it
should not be a Fourth Amendment search to infer an Internet
user's activity by visiting the public websites she visited. Yet the
Kyllo majority, in a somewhat unclear rejoinder, explained that the
search "is not the police's ... inferencing, but their ... thermal-
imaging measurement of the emanations from a house."'98
How can the observation of exposed, external information,
entirely unprotected if observed with the naked eye,199 be a search?
The principle behind the privilege cases is at work once again-
when noncontent peripheral information reveals content infor-
mation, it must itself be treated as content. Thus, in Karo, Kyllo's
predecessor, the Court held that the use of an electronic beacon to
193. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
194. Id. at 35.
195. Id. at 35-36.
196. Id. at 40.
197. Id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 37 n.4 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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monitor the location of a can of ether was itself a search because it
revealed information about the inside of the suspect's home. °" In
Karo, whether noncontent information-the signal from a beeper-
was protected under the Fourth Amendment depended entirely on
whether it revealed protected content information.2"' When
government agents did not know which locker the can was stored in,
monitoring of the beeper did not constitute a search because it
"revealed nothing about the contents of the locker."20 2 But when
monitoring of the beeper inevitably revealed the contents of a home
(or locker for that matter 20 ), the monitoring itself was a Fourth
Amendment search.20 4
A similar, probably even more protective rule was applied in
Kyllo. There, the government specifically measured external heat
information that was consistent with the use of halide lamps, which
led them directly to the conclusion that halide lamps were being
used inside the house.2 5 As the Court stated, the distinction be-
tween the external and internal information in such a situation
would be a distinction without a difference.20 6 In other words, the
details of the house were exposed for all practical purposes as soon
as the external information was obtained, and the Court would
essentially be putting blinders on if it pretended otherwise.
In light of this principle, the meaning of the majority's statement
about inference becomes clear. 20 7 The inference itself is not the
search. The search is the acquisition of noncontent information that
obviously, as in Karo, or for all practical purposes, as in Kyllo, will
reveal protected content. The implications of this rule for the
content status of URLs and other Internet communications are
significant. Further, despite the differing contexts (home or locker
content versus communicative content), the analogies become easy
to draw. Like a tracking beeper that precisely discloses the contents
200. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 708, 715 (1984).
201. See id.
202. Id. at 720.
203. See id. at 720 n.6 (stating that "[h]ad the monitoring disclosed the presence of the
container within a particular locker," use of the beeper would have constituted a search).
204. See id. at 715.
205. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
206. Id. at 36.
207. See id. at 37 n.4.
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of a home or storage space, URL information reveals exactly the
contents of underlying web surfing communications, and should
therefore be treated the same as the contents themselves. Like
information taken from the outside of a house that for all practical
purposes reveals what is occurring inside the house, IP address
information that reveals the subject matter or purpose of an
underlying communication should receive the same protection as
the communication itself.2"8
Karo and Kyllo stand for the principle that, in Fourth Amend-
ment law, content-revealing information must be treated like
content. While this principle has been disputed by a sizable minority
of the Court (and has gone unrecognized by which Internet surveil-
lance scholars),2 °9 it is implicit in the holdings of both cases, and the
Court's acceptance of it should ultimately not be all that surprising.
Like the law of privilege, the law of search and seizure is not fooled
by technicalities. When the government obtains peripheral informa-
tion that reveals protected content information, constitutional law
will not put on blinders and pretend that no search has occurred. In
accordance with this principle, URL information that reveals
communications content should be treated as content itself for the
purposes of constitutional law.
D. Website IP Addresses
In theory, website IP addresses, like URLs, might reveal the web
page contents being viewed by an Internet user.21° An IP address
can often be used to determine the domain name of the website
contacted, either by simply entering the IP address into a web
browser like a URL or by looking it up in an IP address database.21" '
As with URLs, observation of the IP addresses contacted by an
Internet user might be used to determine the website viewed
regardless of whether the IP address information is obtained
208. See infra Part III.D.
209. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Justice Stevens in the Kyllo
dissent. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. See Georgiton, supra note 80, at 1846; McPhie, supra note 82, at 38.
211. Georgiton, supra note 80, at 1846 n.73; Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values
with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH. L. 288, 296 n.45 (2001).
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contemporaneously or in records of past web surfing communica-
tions.212 On the other hand, IP addresses reveal significantly less
about the content of web surfing communications than do URLs;
they do not point to a specific page on a website, but instead may
refer to any one of a number of pages. They do not even necessarily
reveal that a user has viewed the main page of a website, as the
user's computer would communicate with the same IP address even
if she jumped immediately to a specific page from the web host's
database213 (perhaps directed there by a search engine). Further,
multiple websites may share the same IP address.2 4 It is generally
difficult to determine whether a given website shares its IP address
with another website, at least without directly contacting the
web host.21 5 Thus, in most cases, IP addresses will not reveal the
underlying content or even subject matter of Internet communica-
tions with anything approaching the certainty of URLs.
Still, in cases in which a single website uses a single IP address,
and when that website is either small enough or subject-specific
enough, mere knowledge of the IP address contacted by the user
could inevitably reveal the contents of the underlying communica-
tion. If so, under the above framework,1 6 the IP address itself,
though not technically content under a narrow definition of the
term, should nonetheless be treated and protected as content.
For example, some websites, especially personal websites, may
only contain one or two pages.21 7 If such websites happened to have
their own IP addresses, they would reveal as much or nearly as
much about the content of the underlying web surfing communica-
tion as would URLs. Of course, smaller websites like these are also
212. The IP address can be used to determine the domain name of the website contacted,
see, e.g., Georgiton, supra note 80, at 1846 n.73; Helms, supra note 211, at 296 n.45, which can
in turn be entered into Internet Archive to determine the content of the main page of the
website on a given day.
213. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 617-18 (E.D. Pa.
2004).
214. Id. at 618.
215. Id. at 619.
216. See supra Part II.
217. For example, the now-defunct website amyboyer.org, which memorialized a young girl
killed by an Internet stalker, apparently contained only two pages. The archived site is
available at Amy Lynn Boyer, http://web.archive.orgweb/20021204212240/http://www.
amyboyer.orglindex.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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likely to share an IP address with multiple other sites.21s IP
addresses assigned to larger websites might also reveal the subject
matter and purpose of the underlying Internet communications.
Again, the framework outlined above would dictate that such IP
addresses should be treated as the content they inevitably reveal.219
Still, such a situation would only arise if a website had a unique IP
address, if this knowledge were obtained by government or private
entities, and if any page of the website would obviously reveal the
purpose and subject matter of the communication. For example, if
the website of a prescription drug was large enough to have its own
IP address, and its identity clearly revealed the purpose of the
Internet user's communication, a court should treat the IP address
itself as it would treat the actual content of the website.22 °
The few courts that have considered the content status of IP
addresses have too readily dismissed the possibility that IP
addresses will reveal content.221 In Forrester, the Ninth Circuit
expressed its concern about the ability of URLs to reveal content but
concluded that IP addresses "reveal no more about the underlying
contents of communications than do phone numbers" and are
constitutionally indistinguishable from them.222 In the ECPA
context, a magistrate who expressed grave concerns about URLs
and email subject lines revealing content nonetheless concluded
that if "the government is seeking only IP addresses of the websites
visited and nothing more, there is no problem. 223
218. See id. (noting that the site is hosted by 'Prospeed.net," a web server provider).
219. See supra Part III.D.
220. For example, if the Propecia website, which contains multiple pages, had its own
unique IP address, the purpose of an Internet user's communications with the website could
be revealed simply through the IP address. See Propecia, http://www.propecia.comlfinasteridel
propecialconsumer/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (one can also access the website by
entering the IP address 155.91.16.15 into a web browser). The cases involving noncontent
information that reveals the medical condition of patients receiving a certain treatment are
directly analogous. See, e.g., City of Alhambra, 168 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007).
222. Id. The court provides the example of an IP address pointing to the New York Times's
website, which would not disclose anything about the content of the underlying
communications. See id. at 1049 n.6. This is surely correct, but the court overlooks the
possibility of other websites' IP addresses revealing more about the subject matter of the
underlying communications.
223. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 396
F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D. Mass. 2005).
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Although it is true that IP addresses probably do not reveal
anything about the underlying content of web surfing communica-
tions, courts must recognize the possibility that the purpose or
subject matter of certain communications might be exposed simply
through the disclosure of an IP address. Of course, fact-intensive
determinations of whether an IP address discloses content are
probably not an efficient use of judicial resources. Courts can likely
get around the difficulties inherent in such inquiries by prospec-
tively barring the government from questioning web hosts about
which domains use a given IP address or, if web surfing communica-
tions are protected by the Fourth Amendment,224 retrospectively
excluding evidence derived from IP addresses which reveal the
contents of websites read by an Internet user.
E. Size of Information Accessed or Files Downloaded from
Websites
The government's pen register software can and likely does collect
information about the amount of data transferred between an
Internet user and a host website.2 5 Indeed, this may have occurred
in Forrester, when the government's pen register captured the "total
volume of information sent to or from [the defendant's] account. 226
This might refer to the total volume of the defendant's web surfing
activity, but, given the function of the government's pen register
software, more likely refers to the total volume of information sent
to and from each website. If so, the court erred when it approved
this capture as "constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of
a [telephone] pen register. 227 Unlike the volume of data information
that a pen register collects from email transmissions, volume
information for individual websites may reveal the contents of web
surfing communications, perhaps just as clearly as URLs do. Of
course, for complex websites with many pages and/or many
downloadable files, such total volume information is unlikely to
yield much information beyond that already revealed by the IP
224. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
225. See IITRI REPORT, supra note 57, at C-5.
226. Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1044.
227, Id. at 1049.
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address. However, for smaller, simpler websites, such information
allows for a complete reconstruction of the content viewed and
downloaded.
For instance, imagine that a simple website consisting of only
four web pages and minimal text (constituting roughly 100 kb of
data in total) allows users to download three files: a pdf of the
Gettysburg Address (500 kb), a pdf of the Constitution (1000 kb),
and a pdf of the long, rambling manifesto of a subversive political
group (10,000 kb). If the user downloads any of the files, capturing
the total volume of website activity tells an observer where the user
surfed and which documents he downloaded (and in all probability,
read228): 600 kb of total activity means the user downloaded the
Gettysburg Address; 1100 kb the Constitution; 1600 kb, both; 10,100
kb, the manifesto; and so on.229 In such situations, the argument
that total volume data that reveals the content of web surfing
communications should be treated as content for the purposes of
constitutional law tracks exactly the argument about URLs made
above.
F. Summary
At this point, it is possible to map the discussion of Internet
communications in Parts II and III onto the content/noncontent
framework developed in Karo and Kyllo. URLs, IP addresses, and
email to/from information differ from each other in terms of how
much they reveal about their underlying content. Observers can
form inferences about content from all of these types of information,
but the level of content exposure differs in terms of (1) what kind
of additional information is required in order to learn about the
228. Cf. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007) (describing how
police obtained a search warrant to search defendant's home based on a tip that he subscribed
to websites containing images of child pornography); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065,
1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that membership in a website that allowed users to
download photographs gave rise to a "fair probability" that the user had obtained and seen
those photographs).
229. A similar hypothetical could be developed if a website had a limited number of
different web pages of distinct data sizes. The total volume information would reveal which
pages had been viewed by the user.
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content, 230 and (2) how much content is ultimately exposed. Table 1
displays these differences between the types of Internet communica-
tions and matches the different types of information to analogous
physical information in Karo and Kyllo.2"'
230. Recall that many of the arguments that email to/from information reveals content
depend on the idea that the identities of email senders plus additional information about the
senders (for example, that they are drug dealers) can allow investigators to make educated
guesses about content. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part III.C.3. A similar table could be developed for the analogous
communications information in the privilege law context. See supra Part III.C.2.
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Table 1
(Internet communications are described in plain text.
Physical analogies are described in italics.)
Type of What Can the What Can the To What Level
Information Information Information Reveal of Certainty
Alone Reveal? When Coupled with Does the
Additional Information
Information? Reveal Content?
Body of email
text. Content of
website commu- Reveals content
nications and with certainty.
user inputs. Content. No additional infor-
Email subject mation is necessary. Treated as con-
lines. tent.
The interior of a
locker.
The content of the Reveals content
URL underlying web
information. page; user search with certainty
information. No additional infor- in virtually all
Beeper transmis- mation is necessary. cases.
sions from a Location of a can; Treated as content
homing device, the content of a (Karo).
locker.
Coupled with informa-
IP address of Numbers. May tion that the websiteSaddess cof- reveal the domain has only a few pages,
website con.
tacted. Size of name of a website or files of distinct Coupled with the
total transmis- associated with sizes, may reveal the appropriate infor-the IP address, if content transmitted to mation, revealsIntbetee the address is the user. for all practical
Internet user
and a website. unique to the purposes what
website. Coupled with informa- is going on.
tion about the heat
Thermaion The precise output of halide If so, treated asfrom the exterior amount of heat lamps, may reveal content (Kyllo).
of a house radiating from the that the interior of the
house, house contains halide
lamps.
Name of an ISP
Email to/from subscriber or the
information; ISP sender of an email. Coupled with informa- Educated guess,
subscriber infor- Existence and size tion about the sender at best.
mation; email of a communica- or recipient (or the
length. tion. owner of the locker), Not treated as con-
may allow guesses as tent.
The outside of a The appearance to content.
locker, and location of the
locker.
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The conceptual framework developed in Parts II and III above
offers a means to resolve the difficult question 232 of whether certain
Internet communications should be considered content or
noncontent. Further, the "content revealing" principle applied to
URLs above can very likely be used by courts to establish the
content status of future communications technologies, no matter
how complex or different from traditional postal mail. The discus-
sion above has focused on the categories of communications that
have been the most controversial and hardest to classify. According
to the framework, URLs and email subject lines should be treated
as content in all situations, whereas information about the total size
of communications with websites and IP addresses should be
treated as content only in certain situations. Though determining
the content/noncontent status of these categories will not resolve the
debates over the appropriate level of statutory and constitutional
protection afforded to Internet communications, determining which
Internet communications are content and which are not has the
potential to clarify and even to change the terms of these debates.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Knowing the content status of a certain type of Internet communi-
cation information does not automatically determine the level of
constitutional or statutory protection that information will receive.
As mentioned above, this paper has thus far separated out the
question of protection from the question of content/noncontent
status.233 Yet, the above discussion has significant implications for
the ultimate question of whether and to what degree Internet
communications are protected by privacy law. This is especially true
for the most controversial and hardest to classify categories of
Internet communication information: web surfing data such as
URLs and IP addresses.
232. See Kerr, supra note 49, at 645.
233. See discussion supra Part II.
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A. Internet Communications in Constitutional Law
Though URLs and other content-revealing web surfing informa-
tion should be treated as content for the purposes of the constitu-
tional law of communications, it is far from clear that this content
is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Ultimately, a defendant
asserting that a government acquisition of her URL data without a
warrant violates the Fourth Amendment must establish that she
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in such data. But can
Internet users have such an expectation in even the content of
Internet communications? This section offers some preliminary
conclusions and predictions about how Smith and other relevant
cases might be applied to different types of Internet communications
content.
Certainly, numerous courts and commentators have read Smith
as holding that the content/noncontent distinction is crucial to
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their communications information.234 Perhaps the
strongest argument that only noncontent information can be de-
nied Fourth Amendment protection under Smith is that Smith's
predecessor Katz based its constitutional protection of telephone
calls on the pervasiveness of telephone communications and a
normative conclusion that individuals were entitled to privacy in the
contents of their telephone conversations.235 As the Court stated in
Katz, one who places a telephone call "is surely entitled ... that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world."23 One could argue that the Smith opinion could only avoid
234. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 471 (6th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, **3-4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000); David J. Phillips,
Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communication, 8 CoMM.
L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2003) ("In effect, the Court in Smith promulgated a distinction between the
contents of telephone messages and other attributes of those messages, including their source,
destination and duration. While preserving the strongest Fourth Amendment protection for
content, it removed constitutional protection from noncontent attributes."); Georgiton, supra
note 80, at 1841, 1846 n.73 (discussing Smith and stating that if IP addresses were held to
be content, the Fourth Amendment would apply to them).
235. See Freiwald, supra note 7, at 29 ("To read the Constitution more narrowly is to
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication."'
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967))).
236. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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this normative conclusion on the basis of the fact that telephone
numbers are not content.
Yet Smith itself provides several overlapping rationales for
denying Fourth Amendment protection to dialed phone numbers.
Any or all of these additional rationales could be the basis for
denying Fourth Amendment protection even to email and web
surfing content. The rationales are identified below in the order in
which they appear in the Smith opinion.
After distinguishing Katz on the basis of the noncontent status of
telephone numbers, the Smith Court first concluded that a tele-
phone user likely has no subjective expectation of privacy in
telephone numbers. Telephone users convey phone numbers to the
telephone company."7 The phone company has facilities for making
permanent records of the numbers dialed, and telephone users are
aware of this because they receive a bill each month listing the
phone numbers contacted.23 Further, phone companies regularly
employ pen registers to identify fraud, violations of the law,
defective dials, overbilling, or obscene callers.239 In sum, users
convey telephone numbers to the phone company, which can record
them, and in fact does so for "a variety of legitimate business
purposes. '24
Second, even if the user has a subjective expectation of privacy,
it is not one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively
reasonable. The Court cited United States v. Miller,241 which found
no expectation of privacy in business records held by a third party,
and concluded that a person has "no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntary turns over to third parties"
because she assumes the risk that the third party will turn over (or
be forced to turn over) such information to the government.242 The
Smith court thus implicitly extended the "third party doctrine" of
237. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 742-43.
240. Id. at 743.
241. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The Court also cited several cases involving information disclosed
to undercover government informants. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
242. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
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Miller to carriers of communications intended for another private
party.
Third, the Court pointed out that telephone call routing informa-
tion was previously carried out by human operators, and that such
information conveyed to a human operator would have clearly been
disclosed.243 The Court refused to find that an expectation of privacy
in such numbers was preserved just because the phone companies
had automated their routing systems. The rationale of Miller, that
there could be no expectation of privacy in records "exposed to ...
employees in the ordinary course of business,"44 was apparently
extended in Smith to cover information exposed to a telephone
company's "equipment."45
It is, unfortunately, not clear in Smith which of its rationales was
central to the Court's holding, and which represented a marshalling
of justifications in support of an already-reached conclusion. As
courts and commentators have pointed out, some of the rationales
may apply equally well to the content of telephone calls that the
Court explicitly deems protected.2 4' Having determined the content
status of various Internet communications, we can begin to examine
how these rationales might apply when lower courts (or the
Supreme Court) grapple with the question of how to apply Smith to
determine Internet communications' Fourth Amendment status.
1. Subjective Expectations of Internet Users
The three reasons given in Smith to support the idea that
telephone users have no subjective expectation of privacy in their
phone numbers-(1) numbers are conveyed, (2) the phone company
can record them, and (3) the phone company does record them for
legitimate business purposes-should be considered together. Not
only does the Smith opinion group them together,247 but the first
243. Id. at 744.
244. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
245. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
246. See, e.g., id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455,
470-71 (6th Cir. 2007); McPhie, supra note 82, at 62.
247. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 ("Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must
convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities
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two reasons alone are probably applicable to telephone calls
themselves.24 The distinction between phone calls and phone
numbers appears only in the last of the three points: phone
companies generally do not record the content of phone calls.249
How does this three-pronged inquiry apply to Internet communi-
cations content? In Warshak, the Sixth Circuit panel found that
Internet users had a reasonable expectation of privacy in email
content because, as with phone call content, ISPs did not access or
record the content of emails as a matter of course.2 50 On the other
hand, Warshak has been vacated, 251 and future courts could hold
that ISPs do in fact access or record emails in the ordinary course
of business. First, ISPs generally make copies of emails during
transmission.252 Second, ISPs routinely scan users' emails for
viruses, spam, and child pornography, and may even scan them for
certain keywords in order to tailor advertisements to the user.253
The en banc court, or any other court facing the issue of email
content's Fourth Amendment status, could certainly find that email
content is disclosed to ISPs in such a way as to erode any subjective
expectation of privacy under Smith.
A court would be far more likely to find URL content to be
unprotected under Smith's subjective expectation analysis than it
would email content. URL data can be recorded by ISPs, and the
data may or may not be combined with personal information
collected by the ISP or from other sources.254 Although the actual
practices of various ISPs are difficult to determine, news reports
(and a review of ISP privacy policies) indicate that, most likely,
for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this
information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.")
248. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
249. See Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471.
250. Id.
251. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (vacating 490 F.3d
455 (6th Cir. 2007) as unripe).
252. See GRALLA, supra note 26, at 87; Mulligan, supra note 26, at 1563 (noting also that
unencrypted email messages could be read by ISP employees.).
253. See Warshak, 490 F.3d at 474; Gmail, About Gmail, More on Gmail and Privacy,
http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about-privacy.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
254. See Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress,
23 NoVA L. REv. 551, 559-60 (1999); Skok, supra note 80, at 65-67. See generally Solove, supra
note 45, at 1092-95 (discussing government acquisition of online data).
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some ISPs record URL data (and likely transmit this data to third
party advertisers255), and some do not.256 In this environment of
uncertainty, a court could find that Internet users do not retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their URL data, which at least
some ISPs likely record and even disclose to third-party adver-
tisers.257 A court might instead emphasize the objective/normative
aspect of the reasonable exptectation test and decide that Internet
users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their URL data
regardless of the current (often surreptitious) practice of their
ISPs. 258 Alternately, a court could conduct a fact-specific inquiry and
255. Cf. In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(describing how a website disclosed URL data to a third-party advertiser's server, which in
turn produced targeted advertising on the website).
Website-specific URL data is also frequently recorded by the websites themselves, generally
via "cookies." See, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2003).
Aside from the fact that such data is far less revealing than the all-sites web surfing data that
ISPs might record, data subpoenaed from an intended third-party recipient is likely not
protected under Fourth Amendment law, unless that recipient herself has a Fourth
Amendment interest in it. See Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471; see also, e.g., Exparte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 735 (1877) (stating that postal laws may be enforced by gathering evidence from the
recipients of letters, but not by obtaining letters in transit). Note that the government would
either have to obtain revealing IP address information that may legally be content from an
ISP or have to guess that an Internet user had visited a certain website in order to subpoena
such data.
256. Ryan Singel, Which ISPs Are Spying on You?, WIRED, May 30, 2007, available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/05/isp-privacy ("AOL, AT&T and Cox
all say they don't store ... [users] URLs at all, while Qwest dodged the question. Comcast,
EarthLink, Verizon and Time Warner didn't respond."); see, e.g., Comcast Customer Privacy
Notice, available at http://www.comcast.comIMediaLibrary/1/2/CMIVanityURLdocuments/
customerprivacylPrivacyPolicyUniLegal-stnd ENGspksomcastcom.pdf.
257. But cf. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1049 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (suggesting
that URL data may be constitutionally protected because it reveals underlying commu-
nications content).
258. Such an approach may be necessary to avoid a potentially pernicious circularity in the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. For instance, Internet users' subjective expectations
may be shaped by the intrusive policies of ISPs taking advantage of the current ambiguity in
privacy law to disclose their private information to third parties. Allowing ISPs' disclosure of
their customers' information, often without their knowledge, to determine the level of
constitutional protection such information receives could lead to an erosion in privacy
protections for all types of electronic communications. Such an approach would enshrine the
practices of early-adopting private entities into the constitutional law governing new
technologies. Unless customers are well informed, have access to a variety of competing
service providers, and are motivated to contract only with service providers that offer high
levels of privacy, the privacy protections they secure from service providers in the early stages
of a communications technology's development may be minimal. An overemphasis on the
subjective aspect of the reasonable expectation of privacy test may consistently set privacy
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base its finding on either the individual privacy policy of the ISP, 2 9
or whether the ISP combines URL data with personal informa-
tion.26 ° Indeed, some recent cases have suggested that a user's
reasonable expectations of privacy should hinge upon her ISP's
individual privacy policies, rather than the nature of the informa-
tion captured.261 Under this approach, an email system with a policy
of never reading or scanning user's emails may create a reasonable
expectation of privacy for its users, whereas a system such as Gmail,
which informs users that the contents of their emails will be
scanned and content-relevant ads placed in the margins of the web
page,262 may destroy any constitutional expectation of privacy.
Fourth Amendment protection could depend on the 'limited
circumstances" in which the privacy policy allows the ISP to access
email content,26 or even on the level of spam protection chosen by
the email user.264
2. Objective Reasonableness of the Expectations of Internet
Users
At first blush, the third party doctrine of Miller and Smith
appears to cover the disclosure to a third party of any information
that can be recorded. Because this would also encompass telephone
protections for new communications technologies at this minimal level. The author plans to
analyze this issue more fully in a subsequent paper.
259. See Smith v. Maryland, 425 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (quoting a phone company policy
statement); see also id. at 745 (stating that regardless of whether a telephone actually records
such information, the fact that it was free to do so indicated the lack of an expectation of
privacy).
260. See Comcast Customer Privacy Notice, supra note 256.
261. See Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 526-27 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(asserting that case-specific inquiries into individual privacy policies were required in order
to assess email users' reasonable expectations of privacy); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J.
406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (describing how the uniquely protective email policy of America
Online was a factor that strongly indicated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the instant
case).
262. See More on Gmail and Privacy, supra note 253.
263. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 474.
264. Microsoft's Hotmail email service, for instance, allows users to select their level of
spain protection. At the highest level, all mail is sent to the junkmail folder, and users select
certain email addresses to be sent directly to the inbox. On this setting, no scanning of email
content for spain would be necessary. See MSN Hotmail Help-Frequently Asked Questions,
http://postmaster.msn.com/FAQ.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
2160
CONTENT/ENVELOPE DISTINCTION
conversations, a more coherent reading of the Court's rationale is
that any information disclosed to a service provider and used by
that service provider's equipment in the ordinary course of business
lacks any constitutional privacy protection. 6 ' If a court were to read
Smith in this way, it would not matter whether the information was
classified as content. URL data would obviously be disclosed to ISP
routing equipment in the ordinary course of business. Email con-
tent would be exposed to ISP equipment in the normal course of
business, though the content would generally not be used to route
the email. On the other hand, spain filters that do not let emails
with certain contents pass could easily be conceived of as using the
content to route the emails. A court adopting this line of analysis
from Smith may have to determine whether this "routing distinc-
tion" between URL content and email content is significant. Also, a
court might distinguish email content from URL content on the
basis that the disclosure of email content to spai filters is not
intentional disclosure, because the Internet user only perceives
herself as disclosing email addresses themselves to the ISP's
equipment.266 The rule resulting from this plausible distinction
would be that any routing information, even if it contained content
(including search terms), would be considered intentionally
disclosed to an ISP for Fourth Amendment purposes. Alternately,
the reasonableness of an email user's expectation of privacy might
depend upon whether she uses a service like Gmail or whether she
is aware that her email provider scans her emails with a spain
filter.
3. Disclosure to Automated Systems
The disclosure identified in Smith's objective reasonableness
analysis hinges on the idea that phone companies' decisions to
automate their routing services do not affect the reasonable
expectation of privacy users have in their telephone numbers.
Extending this concept to Internet communications would very
265. See Mulligan, supra note 26, at 1579 (arguing that Smith and Miller limit their
holdings to records in which the third party has an independent interest; the phone company
has an interest in phone numbers because it uses them to connect calls).
266. Id. at 1580.
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likely be necessary if a court were to hold that Internet users
intentionally disclose their web surfing information to third parties.
Although ISPs might record users' URL data and even link that
data with personal information when disclosing it to third party
advertising services, the process is, at least in most situations,
entirely automated.267
4. Four General Options for a Court Applying Smith to Internet
Communications Content
Based on the above discussion, this Section evaluates several
general approaches that a court deciding the constitutional status
of Internet communications content might take.
First, a court could adopt the argument that the content of
communications as widely used and relied upon as email and web
surfing is protected by the Fourth Amendment under the implicitly
normative analysis in Katz, and that the "third party doctrine"
reasoning in Smith is limited to noncontent information. Under
this approach, determining that a type of Internet communication
information is content essentially decides the matter of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. URL data, email content, and IP address and
file download size information that reveal contents would all be
protected under the Fourth Amendment. There is, in fact, some
support for such a position in post-Smith Supreme Court cases. The
Court has stated in several cases that a normative judgment under
the "objectively reasonable" prong of Katz is generally the most
important determinant of Fourth Amendment protection, and
trumps any contrary conclusion based on subjective expectations of
privacy.68 Further, in one recent decision, the Court indicated that,
267. See In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(describing how a third-party advertising server automatically couples URL data with
personal profile data and uses "a complex set of algorithms" to "determine which
advertisements it will present to the user"); Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New
Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 294 n.58 (2005) (describing how ISPs typically
aggregate user information and how human ISP employees may find it extremely difficult to
identify users personally).
268. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 & n.7 (1984) (stating that the objective prong
of Katz is of primary importance and that the objective inquiry contains a normative element);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (same); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (stating that when a subjective analysis would be insufficiently
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at least in some special cases, individuals may retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily given to a third
party if their reasonable expectation is that the party will not
disseminate that information."9 A court might determine that
Internet users have a similar (albeit empirically incorrect) reason-
able expectation as to their Internet communications data.
Second, a court could apply Smith's third party doctrine analysis
but distinguish some or all Internet communications content from
telephone numbers. Subjectively, Internet communications content
might easily be distinguished on the basis that Internet users,
unlike telephone users, are likely unaware that their ISP may be
keeping records of their web surfing data or making copies (in the
course of transmission) of their emails.27 ° A court might point to the
intimate and private nature of emails and of some Internet activity,
which can encompass everything from Internet voting271 to viewing
pornography,272 as evidence that Internet users maintain at least a
subjective expectation of privacy in their Internet use. Finally, a
court might rely on the policy of the ISP in the instant case and
determine that the policy is sufficiently protective as to create a
subjective expectation of privacy in web surfing data.273
protective of Fourth Amendment values, courts should engage in a normative inquiry based
on the objective prong).
269. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (finding a constitutional
privacy interest in diagnostic medical tests in which a patient's "reasonable expectation of
privacy ... is that the results of those tests will not be shared ... without her consent").
270. See, e.g., JOSEPH TUROW, AMERICANS & ONLINE PRIVACY: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN
(2003), available at http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/internet-privacy-report/36-page-
turow-version-9.pdf (reporting the results of several polls indicating that Americans do not
understand the extent to which their online activities are recorded).
271. Rebekah K. Browder, Internet Voting with Initiatives and Referendums: Stumbling
Toward Direct Democracy, 29 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 485, 497 (2005) (describing five examples
of Internet voting, in Alaska, Arizona, Washington, and Michigan, and by military personnel
living abroad). Note that URL records could reveal for whom an Internet user voted, although
this would only occur if the URL activated after the user clicked on Candidate A's name
differed from the URL activated after clicking on Candidate B's name.
272. See David Crary, Battle Brews as Porn Moves into Mainstream, S.F. GATE, Apr. 1,
2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/n/a/2006/04/01/national/
a131130S42.DTL (reporting that 40 percent of Internet users in the United States visit
pornographic sites each month).
273. Cf. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (CA.A.F. 1996) (finding that America
Online's protective email policy contributed to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of a user's email).
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As far as the objective prong of the analysis, a court ruling on the
Fourth Amendment status of URLs or email content might distin-
guish Smith on the basis of its "automation" rationale.274 The Smith
Court's argument that disclosures to automated telephone equip-
ment destroyed any reasonable expectation of privacy could be
limited to the telephone context-the Court's argument is based
largely upon the fact that human operators once obtained the
numbers themselves27 (and possibly that human employees in the
billing department might view the information as well).276 This is
certainly not the case for email or URL data, which Internet users
can reasonably expect will never be perceived by a human being at
any point (unless perhaps that human being is a government
investigator).277 Indeed, a court might incorporate the same argu-
ments about the importance of the normative aspect of the objec-
tively reasonable prong as a court taking the first approach, holding
that Internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
web surfing data because it would be normatively unacceptable for
their ISPs' human employees ever personally to observe users'
content-revealing data.278 Alternately, a court might find that only
email content is protected by the Fourth Amendment, distinguish-
ing email content from URL content on the basis of the distinctions
traced above.279
Third, a court might decide, on the basis of the rationales
discussed in Parts IV.A-B, that the principles of Smith suggest that
all web surfing and email communications content is disclosed to a
third party, and therefore users cannot have an objectively reason-
able expectation of privacy in such data. Such an approach would
274. See Simmons, supra note 188, at 1338-39 (characterizing Smith's automation ratio-
nale as an afterthought that is now highly problematic given modern communications
technology).
275. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979).
276. Id. at 742.
277. Cf. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
individuals maintain a reasonable expectation that ISPs do not generally access the contents
of emails); In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
("DoubleClick's targeted advertising process is invisible to the user. His experience consists
simply of requesting the Lycos.com homepage and, several moments later, receiving it
complete with banner advertisements.").
278. See supra text accompanying notes 268-69.
279. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
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likely rely on the language in Smith indicating that the individual
recording policies of telephone companies are ultimately irrelevant
to the Fourth Amendment analysis and establishing a bright line
rule that telephone users have no privacy interest in their phone
numbers regardless of whether they are monitored by the phone
21company. s Though predicting the course of the constitutional law
of Internet communications is extremely difficult, it appears that
most courts are likely to choose this third approach in upcoming
Internet surveillance cases, given that the language of Smith
suggests in many places a third party doctrine with an extremely
broad scope.281
Finally, a court might take another approach, one that would
further muddle an already unclear body of Fourth Amendment
Internet surveillance law. That is, a court might fail to recognize
that URLs and other content-revealing data should be treated as
content in Fourth Amendment analysis. Under this approach, a
court would simply determine that URLs are routing information,
and thus not content, and would stop the Fourth Amendment
analysis there, citing Smith's content/noncontent distinction. Not
only would this outcome be incorrect as a matter of law, but unlike
the first three approaches, it would permit courts to dispose of
Internet surveillance cases without shedding any light on the
enduring meaning of Smith, a precedent which will surely only
become more important as new forms of communication proliferate
and become widely used.
Perhaps the most significant benefit of a clearer understanding
of content and noncontent in Internet communications would be the
way it would force courts to decide the difficult but important
questions that persist in Internet surveillance law. Courts would be
forced to confront the analysis of reasonable expectations of privacy
head on, either clearly determining that some forms of Internet
280. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745 (expressing concern that case-by-case evaluation of disclosure
would "make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment").
281. For cases applying Smith and Miller's third party doctrine broadly, see United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117-22 (1984) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of a box accidentally exposed to a third party carrier); United States v. Cormier, 220
F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in motel records);
United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that defendants had no
privacy interest in personal records conveyed by their bank to another party).
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communications content are protected by the Fourth Amendment,
or clearly determining that there can be no reasonable expectation
of privacy in any form of Internet communications content. Either
outcome would be preferable to the current situation, in which the
government could obtain web surfing and email communications
content entirely unchecked by the Fourth Amendment and Internet
users are largely unaware that their web surfing data and even
email content receive dramatically less protection than the content
of their phone calls.
Fortunately, the few courts to have considered the content status
of URLs thus far have indicated without deciding that URL data
might be treated as content, especially when the URL contains
search terms.282 Given this early precedent, it seems somewhat
likely that future courts squarely confronting the issue will realize
that URLs reveal the entirety of their underlying content, and thus
must be treated like content themselves. The outlook is not so good,
however, for web surfing communications that can be more easily
analogized to envelope information: IP addresses and file size
downloads. Courts commenting on the status of IP addresses have
thus far erroneously assumed that they have no potential to reveal
more about the content of communications than do phone
numbers. ' The volume of website transfers was only briefly
mentioned in Forrester, in which the Ninth Circuit simply (and
erroneously) assumed that such data could not reveal communica-
tions content."s Future courts might also be led astray by the same
inaccurate analogy to the weight of mailed packages, which unlike
file size downloads can reveal nothing specific about package
contents. 285 Though the prospects are currently unfavorable, courts
following the logic of privilege law and Karo and Kyllo (and the logic
of their own arguments about URLs) should recognize that IP
addresses and file download sizes have the potential to reveal just
282. See United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1049 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007); see also In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d
45, 49 (D. Mass. 2005) (discussing web surfing information that may reveal content in the
context of the ECPA).
283. See Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049; In re Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
284. Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049.
285. See, e.g., Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (stating that the outward form and
weight of packages received no constitutional protection).
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as much about web surfing communications content as URLs do in
some situations.
B. Internet Communications in Statutory Law
In contrast with constitutional law, the ECPA clearly sets the
level of protection afforded to URLs and other web surfing infor-
mation deemed content. 2 6 And if, as seems fairly likely, courts
determine that Internet communications content is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment, the ECPA will be the only source of legal
protection for such information. Yet, as mentioned above,287 the fact
that URLs are contents as a matter of constitutional law or general
semantics does not necessarily dictate that they are contents within
the meaning of the ECPA,"8 although there is legislative history
strongly suggesting that Congress intended the statutory definition
to track the constitutional definition.289 Courts examining the plain
language of the statutes, or the legislative intent behind them,
might conclude that URL or other website routing information
constitutes noncontent information under the statute. The question
remains largely unresolved in the few cases dealing with the
acquisition of web surfing data under the ECPA. Those cases have
thus far explicitly determined only that URLs containing search
terms constitute contents under the ECPA.29° Courts dealing with
the ECPA have yet to recognize that all URLs, and not just URLs
containing search terms or identifiable file names, reveal content.
This section examines whether all URLs do in fact meet the
definition of "contents" in the ECPA.
The ECPA incorporates a broad definition of "contents," defining
them as "any information concerning the substance, purport or
meaning of [a] communication."29' Contents are referred to again in
286. See discussion supra Part I.B.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
288. See, e.g., United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[I]nquiries under
[the ECPA] and the Constitution are separate and distinct.").
289. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
290. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2003); In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d
45, 49 (D. Mass. 2005).
291. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006).
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the Pen Register Act, which defines a pen register, which the
government can operate with a mere court order,292 as "a device or
process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling [(DRAS)] information transmitted by an instrument or
facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmit-
ted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the
contents of any communication. ''29" The definition of pen registers
very likely incorporates the definition of "contents" from § 2510,
and, as a result, even routing information must be excluded from
the permissible scope of pen registers if it also constitutes "con-
tents. 294
The plain text of § 2510(8)'s broad definition of contents 295 seems
to incorporate, among other things, any information that discloses
the underlying content of Internet communications. Thus far, courts
applying the ECPA have interpreted "concerning" to encompass
information that reveals or relates in any way to substance or sub-
ject matter.296 Under this interpretation of "concerning," all URLs
concern the substance of Internet electronic communications;
indeed they reveal the substance entirely. Further, "contents"
include any information concerning "the purport or meaning" of
electronic communications. Information such as IP addresses that
reveal which web pages were visited or website-specific total volume
transmission data that reveals pages visited or files downloaded
concern (and reveal) the purport of the underlying web surfing
communications. Courts interpreting the ECPA should hold that
such information, despite its status as routing information, is
"content" within the meaning of the statute.
The history of the ECPA and the Pen Register Act amendments
of 2001 also suggests that "contents" should be interpreted broadly
292. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ease with which
the government can obtain such court orders.
293. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006).
294. See In re Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (stating that the government is not
entitled to acquire DRAS information such as URLs containing search terms if such
information reveals the contents of a communication); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4).
295. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (defining "contents" as "any information concerning the substance"
of communications).
296. In re Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (holding that subject headers are content
because they reveal subject matter); In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st
Cir. 2003) (finding that search terms are information).
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-or at least, interpreted as it would be for the purposes of constitu-
tional law. The legislative history of the original Wiretap Act states,
referring to "contents," that "[t]he privacy of the communication to
be protected is intended to be comprehensive." '297 The current
definition of "contents" in the ECPA was adopted in 1986 to clarify
the legality of telephone pen registers and to mirror the con-
tent/envelope distinction of Smith.298 Congress's intent to mirror the
constitutional definition is made even clearer in the legislative
history of the USA PATRIOT Act's amendments. The relevant
House Report states that the amendments "reinforce the statutorily
prescribed line between a communication's contents and noncontent
information, a line identical to the constitutional distinction drawn
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland."'299 As discussed
above, URLs should be considered contents as a matter of constitu-
tional law, regardless of whether they are protected under Smith's
third party doctrine."'
There is nothing in the legislative history of the USA PATRIOT
Act involving the amendment of the Pen Register -Act to indicate
that Congress did not intend the definition of pen registers to
incorporate fully the broad definition of contents from § 2510(8).
Instead, Congress apparently intended that, "just as" under the
1986 version of the Pen Register Act, a pen register order under the
amendments "could not be used to intercept the contents of
communications protected by the wiretap statute. 3 0' To be sure, the
House Report on the Act seems to contemplate DRAS information
and content information as mutually exclusive categories.0 2 But as
an example of non-DRAS, content information, the Report mentions
URL search terms and even the portion of a URL including "the
name of a requested file or article" as an example of content infor-
mation that could not lawfully be intercepted by a pen register;
03
297. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 91 (1968).
298. See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 34 (1986).
299. H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt.1, at 53 (2001) (citation omitted).
300. See supra Parts III, IV.
301. H.R. REP. No. 107-236 pt.1, at 53; see 147 Cong. Rec. S10372 (Oct. 9, 2001) (statement
of Sen. Leahy) (describing how the Bush administration "agreed that the definition [of pen
registers] should expressly exclude the use of pen/trap devices to intercept content").
302. See H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt.1, at 53.
303. Id.
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of course, any such information appearing in a URL is used to route
web surfing communications. 3" The Report also states that email
subject lines are "clearly" content, 5 further suggesting an endorse-
ment of the idea that envelope information that reveals subject
matter should be interpreted as content under the Act.
Given the plain language of the definition of "contents" and the
general legislative intent that the language be interpreted broadly,
URLs and other content-revealing routing information should be
treated as content under the ECPA. As far as other revealing
information, Congress apparently did not contemplate the possibil-
ity that IP addresses or file size information could reveal the
underlying content of web surfing communications-but then, no
court has done so yet either. The fact remains that such informa-
tion, if it reveals the contents of web surfing communications,
should itself be considered "contents" under the broad definition of
the ECPA.
CONCLUSION
The surveillance of Americans' Internet activities is likely to
increase as both general Internet use and Internet-based crime
become even more widespread. Meanwhile, confusion about the
constitutional status of Internet communications, coupled with the
lack of an exclusionary rule for illegally intercepted electronic
communications, will continue to impede the development of clear
Internet surveillance law.3" 6 The need for courts and scholars to
clarify further the constitutional and statutory protections afforded
to web surfing data is urgent. Courts should recognize that web
surfing data that reveals the underlying content of communications
should itself be treated as content. Not only would this be the
correct legal outcome, it would also force courts to confront the
difficult but necessary questions inherent in applying Smith and the
ECPA to Internet communications. It would also provide courts with
304. Again, search terms are used as an example of protected content; the Report does not
engage in a comprehensive review of web surfing communications. There is no mention
anywhere of IP addresses or file download sizes. In other words, the Report cannot be read
to indicate that Congress intended that only URL search terms should be protected. See id.
305. Id.
306. See Freiwald, supra note 7, T 34; Kerr, supra note 8, at 807.
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a guiding principle that could be applied in the future to establish
the legal status of as-yet-undeveloped communications technologies.
Although there is reason to expect that courts will recognize that
content-revealing web surfing communications are protected under
the ECPA, and reason to doubt that courts will find they are
protected under the Constitution, the actual course that Internet
surveillance law will take remains extremely difficult to predict.
What is certain is that misunderstanding the legal status of
content-revealing communications data would lead courts to
underprotect such data and to make a muddle of Internet surveil-
lance law for years to come. Getting the law of Internet communica-
tions right will likely not be easy for courts--even the Supreme
Court has historically had serious difficulties in applying old laws
to new technologies. In its 1928 decision, Olmstead v. United
States, °7 the Court failed to adapt Fourth Amendment law to the
then-new technology of telephone wiretaps-a mistake that the
court did not correct until nearly forty years later.3"' In the long
interim, the FBI pervasively monitored the private communications
of American citizens, secretly recording the conversations of
countless politicians, activists, celebrities, writers, professors, and
Supreme Court Justices. °9 We can only hope that it does not take
another forty years for courts to determine that the contents of
Internet communications are worthy of legal protection.
307. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
308. Olnstea ds holding that the Fourth Amendment did not protect telephone
conversations was overturned in the 1967 case Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
309. See ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND
THE SUPREME COURT (1992); Solove, supra note 77, at 1273-74.
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APPENDIX
This appendix discusses several unconventional URL forms and
website configurations that exist on the Internet. These configura-
tions differ from conventional URL and website configurations in
that they allow Internet users to access website content without
generating a corresponding URL. The use of these unconventional
forms is relatively limited. Further, website content that does not
correspond to a specific URL is accessible only from web pages that
do correspond to a specific URL. These unconventional forms do not
significantly impact the standard URL-based practice of Internet
navigation, nor does their existence alter the fact that a URL
history reveals the content requested by and sent to an Internet
user. These caveats aside, this appendix describes the extent to
which these unconventional forms themselves may reveal or obscure
Internet communications content.
A. AJAX Programming
AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) applications are web
applications that update portions of a web page without changing
the underlying page (or generating a new URL).31° For instance, a
user visiting a web page could click on a streaming video file and
request a partial page update via an AJAX application. The user
would then receive the video from the web server without having to
wait for an entirely new page to load. AJAX is typically used to
create Rich Internet Applications (RIAs), including registration
forms, web video, and interactive web applications (like web-based
email and word processing) designed to act like traditional desktop
applications.311 Because the AJAX content loads without accessing
a new web page, it is not associated with a unique URL. However,
the original page, where the user finds the AJAX content, is
associated with a URL. It is very likely that this original web
page would reveal to an observer the subject matter of the user's
310. PAuL J. DEITEL & HARVEY M. DEITEL, AJAX, RICH INTERNET APPLICATIONS, AND WEB
DEVELOPMENT FOR PROGRAMMERS 412-14 (2008).
311. Id. at 412-15.
2172 [Vol. 50:2105
CONTENT/ENVELOPE DISTINCTION
communication with the website-that is, the URL of a website
about computer programming manuals which contains AJAX
content 12 would reveal that the user was reading about computer
programming, although it would not be known for certain whether
the user accessed the AJAX content or not. Further, in situations in
which the AJAX application allows the user to receive one of several
partial-page updates, the government may simply infer (perhaps
based on other corroborating evidence) that the user likely viewed
all of them-an inference that may very well hold up in court.313
B. Encrypted URLs
When a user completes and submits a web form (on, say,
Amazon.com) the URL containing the input information is typically
encrypted. Because Amazon has a key to decrypt the content, it can
determine what was sent.314 Third parties who intercept the URL,
however, cannot determine the content of the webpage without the
key. Similarly, websites may encrypt certain URLs in order to
prevent hackers from gaining unauthorized access to secure web
pages."' Encrypted URLs generally consist of an unencrypted
domain name (which directs the request to the appropriate web
server) and an encrypted "locator," "path," or "query string" (the
final portion of a URL that refers to the particular directory and
file sought).316
Evaluating the potential for encrypted URLs to reveal or obscure
content is fairly straightforward. Obtaining an encrypted URL
would generally allow an observer to obtain the domain name of the
website visited by an Internet user-usually this would be sufficient
to reveal the subject matter of the content the user requested and
312. See id. at 420 for an example of such a website.
313. See cases cited supra note 228.
314. HAROLD F. TIPTON& MICKI KRAUSE, INFORMATION SECURITYMANAGEMENT HANDBOOK
1131-32 (6th ed. 2007).
315. Id.
316. See ROLF OPPLIGER, SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE WORLD WIDE WEB 337-38 (2d
ed. 2003); Daniel Estermann, URL Encryption, Phion Airlock Techzone (June 25, 2008),
https://techzone.visonys.com/url-encryption (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); Software Information
Center, The Components of a URL, http'J/publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/cicsts/v3rl/index.
jsp?topic=/com.ibm.cics.ts31.doc/dfhtl/topic/dfhtluricomp.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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viewed. If the domain name somehow failed to reveal the subject
matter communicated, then the encrypted portion of the URL would
(if the encryption works properly) reveal no content whatsoever.
Intercepting and entering the encrypted URL into a web browser
would not produce the desired web page; the web host's encryption
software would detect that the URL had been manipulated by a
third party and would block the request.317 Of course, if the govern-
ment had reason to be interested in which specific encrypted files a
user accessed at a given domain, it might subpoena the web host's
encryption key, allowing it to translate the encrypted URL and to
determine where it led.
C. Website Frames
Frames are an HTML layout feature that allows a web host to
display more than one HTML document in the same web page.31 A
user visiting a website designed with frames might click on a menu
item that directs them to text in a different frame, and then scroll
through the text without altering the original page or changing the
original URL.319 Frames have become increasingly hard to find on
the Internet-there are numerous technical and aesthetic disadvan-
tages to using frames to design a website, and as a result they have
fallen out of favor with many web designers.32 °
As with AJAX, the use of frames would allow the user to access
some content without generating a unique URL. The original page
containing the frame menu, however, is associated with a URL. As
317. See Estermann, supra note 316.
318. H.M. DEITEL, P.J. DEITEL & A.B. GOLDBERG, INTERNET & WORLD WIDE WEB: How TO
PROGRAM 129-34 (3d ed. 2004); JAMEs H. PENCE, HOW TO Do EVERYTHING WITH HTML AND
XHTML 180-81 (2d ed. 2003).
319. PENCE, supra note 318, at 180-81.
320. See, e.g., id.; Don't Use Frames To Design Your Website, http://www.hobo-web.
co.uldtips/41.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); Shirley E. Kaiser, To Frame or Not To Frame:
That is the Question, Website Tips.com, Nov. 2006, http://websitetips.com/articles/html/
frames/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); Utah State University, HTML Frames, http:/!
ocw.usu.edutlnstructional-Technology/producing-distance-education-resources/resource
16.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); WWW FAQs: Should I Use Frames on My Website?,
http://www. boutell.com/newfaq/creatinglframesbad.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); see also
PENCE, supra note 318, at 181-82 (describing the advantages and disadvantages of using
frames).
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with AJAX, it is very likely that this original web page would reveal
to an observer the subject matter of the user's communication with
the website. This is especially likely because websites that use menu
frames often involve a narrow subject matter-for various practical
and design reasons,321 a general interest news website is very
unlikely to employ a menu frame with associated content. For any
web page containing a menu with associated frames, the govern-
ment might also infer that a visitor viewed all of the frames,
particularly if the menu is simple or the subject matter narrow.322
D. A Note on Dynamic URLs
"Dynamic URL" refers to a URL that directs a user to the results
of a search or other query of a website's database.123 For instance,
the UIRL generated by entering search terms on Google is a dynamic
URL, and the web page displayed reflects the results of the search
of Google's database. 4 Dynamic URLs are widely used, and in
practice they function much like "static" URLs, which direct users
to a standard website with content encoded in the HTML coding
language. 325 The primary difference between the two is that a web
host would update a web page associated with a static URL by
changing its HTML code, while the host would update a web page
associated with a dynamic URL by changing the data in the
database . 6 Both kinds of URLs correspond to a specific web page
display. An observer who intercepts a dynamic URL can instantly
obtain the content sent to the user by entering the URL into a web
browser, just as with a static URL. Many web pages associated with
dynamic URLs direct a user to a specific article or file on the
database, which is never updated. Websites with dynamic URLs are
also archived on the Internet Archive website, so, as with static
321. See supra note 320.
322. See cases cited supra note 228.
323. JAIMIE SIROVICH & CRISTIAN DARIE, PROFESSIONAL SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION
WITH PHP: A DEVELOPER'S GUIDE TO SEO 39-40,42-43 (2007); SHARI THUROW, SEARCH ENGINE
VISIBILITY 151-52 (2003).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
325. Id.
326. See SIROVICH & DARIE, supra note 323, at 42-43; THUROW, supra note 323, at 150-51;
Dynamic URL (Jan 8, 2004), http'//www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/dynamic URL.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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URLs, an observer could often view the content that an Internet
user viewed at a specific site on a given date.327 Further, as dis-
cussed above, if the content of a web page could not be ascertained
using the above methods, the government could probably subpoena
the web host for its archived database records-it could thereby
obtain the specific information displayed on a given date.
327. See Internet Archive Frequently Asked Questions, http/www.archive.org/about/faqs.
php#11 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
328. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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